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NOTE 
BOGGS v. BOGGS: STATE 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND 
SUCCESSION RIGHTS WALLOW IN 
ERISA'S MIRE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 2, 1997, the United States Supreme Court decided 
the case of Boggs v. Boggs! and held that the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"f preempted 
Louisiana community property and succession laws and pro-
hibited the inheritance of a nonemployee spouse's community 
interest in pension plan benefits.3 Although the Boggs holding 
involved preemption of a claim based on community property 
and succession rights, the Court's holding is sufficiently broad 
to preempt any state laws that conflict with ERISA4 by pro-
viding a predeceasing nonparticipant, nonbeneficiary spouse 
with transferable property rights in a participant spouse's pen-
sion plan benefits.5 Accordingly, the participant spouse pos-
1. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997). 
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. 1997). 
3. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1760-67 (1997). 
4. See id. at 1760. The Court stated: 
This case involves a community property claim, but our ruling will af-
fect as well the right to make claims or assert interests based on the 
law of any State, whether or not it recognizes community property. Our 
ruling must be consistent with the congressional scheme to assure the 
security of plan participants and their families in every State. 
[d. 
5. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2336 (West 1996). Article 2336 states that "[elach 
spouse owns a present undivided one-half interest in the community property ... " [d. 
571 
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sesses exclusive rights to the pension plan assets until death 
after which the beneficiaries receive the interest by operation 
of federal statute.6 It follows that the non-beneficiary legatees 
and heirs of a predeceasing nonparticipant, nonbeneficiary 
spouse are unable, either directly or indirectly, to benefit from 
any testamentary disposition consisting of pension plan assets 
of the participant spouse.7 Further, this holding extends to 
prevent such heirs and legatees from being awarded nonpen-
sion property of equivalent value in lieu of the plan assets.8 
Under general principles of state community property law, the 
Court's holding divests a nonparticipant spouse of a present 
ownership right and of testamentary power over an interest in 
the community pension plan benefits.9 Thus, the Boggs deci-
sion unexpectedly alters an otherwise predictable system of 
property ownership and succession under state law and, in its 
wake, leaves many married couples with uncertain future es-
tate plans.10 
This Note will summarize the history of Boggs 11 and discuss 
the issues that led to a circuit split between the Fifth and 
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2346 (West 1996). Article 2346 states "[elach spouse acting 
alone may manage, control, or dispose of community property unless otherwise pro-
vided by law." Id. 
6. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1764-65 (1997). 
7. See id. 
8. See id. at 1766,1774-75. 
9. See WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK AND MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 2D EDITION 261-62, 459 (1971). 
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2336 (West 1996). Article 2336 states: 
Each spouse owns a present undivided one-half interest in the commu-
nity property. Nevertheless, neither the community nor the things of 
the community may be judicially partitioned prior to the termination of 
the regime. 
Id. 
WILLIAM Q. DE FuNiAK AND MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY 
PROPERTY 2D EDITION 459 (1971). Community property law allows each spouse to 
transfer his or her community interest to heirs and devisees at death. During mar-
riage, community property law provides for the joint ownership of assets, benefit or 
gain, and liability for loss. See id. 
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2346 (West 1996). Article 2346 states "[elach spouse acting 
alone may manage, control, or dispose of community property unless otherwise pro-
vided by law." Id. 
10. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs v. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No. 
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997). 
11. Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1996), af!'g, 849 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. La. 
1994), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997). 
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Ninth Circuits regarding community property rights and 
ERISA protected pension plan benefits in the testamentary 
context.12 . It will also track ERISA's legislative history to de-
termine Congressional intent.13 In particular, this Note will 
examine inconsistencies among past judicial constructions 
based on the application of ERISA's preemptionI4 and spend-
thriftI5 provisions to regulate private pension plans.16 Further, 
this Note will scrutinize the Court's holding in BoggsI7 giving 
deference to the facts in the record to clarify the problems in-
herent in the majority's questionable reasoning.18 Finally, this 
Note will discuss the broad reach of the BoggsI9 holding in light 
of the practical estate planning considerations and resulting 
uncertainty now faced by lawyers and plan participants and 
spouses in community property states.20 This Note ultimately 
suggests a legislative solution to remedy the adverse effects of 
the Court's holding in Boggs21 in order to avoid any further fed-
eral intrusion upon state granted property ownership and tes-
tamentary rights.22 
See infra notes 23-83 and accompanying text. 
12. Compare Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1996) with Ablamis v. Roper, 
937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991). 
See infra notes 160-93, 278-91 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 84-159 and accompanying text. 
14. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). This clause states that "[e)xcept as provided .. 
. the provisions of this subchapter ... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as 
they may now or hereinafter relate to any employee benefit plan ... " Id. 
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1994). This clause applies only to pension plan 
benefits and states that "[e)ach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under 
the plan may not be assigned or alienated." Id. 
16. See infra notes 160-309 and accompanying text. 
17. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997). 
18. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. 
Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-79); Brief for Respondents, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 
(1997) (No. 96-79); Brief for Petitioner, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-
79). 
19. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997). 
20. See infra notes 310-70 and accompanying text. See generally, Boggs v. Boggs 
Holds That a Predeceasing Nonparticipant Spouse Has No Property Interest in an 
ERISA Pension Plan, 6 No.3 ERISA LIT. RPTR. 4 (August, 1997); Philip H. Wile, Boggs 
v. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No.5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997). 
21. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997). 
22. See infra notes 371-76 and accompanying legislative proposal text. 
3
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II. BOGGS V. BOGGS23 
A. FACTS 
Isaac Boggs, Jr. ("Isaac") was married to his first wife Doro-
thy Boggs ("Dorothy") when he commenced his employment 
with South Central Bell ("BellSouth") in 1949?4 The couple 
had three children, Thomas Frank Boggs, Harry Maurice 
Boggs and David Bruce Boggs ("the sons"),25 and remained 
married until Dorothy's death on August 14, 1979.26 
Isaac remarried on April 5, 1980.27 Isaac and his second 
wife, Sandra Boggs ("Sandra"), remained married until Isaac's 
death on February 16, 1989.28 The couple had no children from 
their marriage.29 Isaac was survived by Sandra and the sons 
from his marriage to Dorothy.3o During all relevant times the 
marital property at issue was governed by Louisiana commu-
nity property laws.31 
Isaac was employed by BellSouth for thirty-six years until 
his retirement in 1985.32 During his employment, he partici-
pated in private, voluntarily funded employee benefit plans 
("pension plan") governed by ERISA.33 Isaac funded his pen-
sion plan with community property; that is, property acquired 
23. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997). 
24. See id. at 1758. 
25. See Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 463 (E.n. La. 1994). 
26. See id. 
27. See id. 
28. See id. 
29. See id. 
30. See Boggs v. Boggs, 89 F.3d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1996). 
31. See id. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2338 (West 1996). Article 2338 states that 
community property includes "property acquired during the existence of the legal re-
gime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse." [d. 
32. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1758 (1997). 
33. See Boggs v. Boggs, 89 F.3d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1996). Brief for Respondents 
at 8, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-79). The private, voluntary and 
community character of the funds used by Isaac to pay into the pension, basically de-
ferred compensation, are "considered fruits of the labor of the community ... " [d. 
4
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by his effort, skill or industry during his thirty year marriage 
to Dorothy and his nearly four year marriage to Sandra.34 
The pension plan was a "qualified plan,>35 and upon Isaac's 
retirement it provided him with the following: (1) a lump-sum 
payment from the BellSouth Management Savings Plan which 
Isaac "rolled over" into an Individual Retirement Account 
("IRA,,);36 (2) a joint and survivor annuity ("Annuity,,);37 (3) 
ninety-six shares of AT&T common stock from the BellSouth 
Employee Stock Ownership Plan ("ESOP,,);38 and (4) a life in-
surance policy naming Sandra as the designated beneficiary.39 
On Dorothy's death, her estate claimed an undivided one-
half interest in all community assets, including Isaac's undis-
tributed pension plan benefits that had accrued up to her date 
of death.40 Under Louisiana's community property system, 
34. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1758 (1997). Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 
462, 463 (E.D. La. 1994). La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2338 (West 1996). Article 2338 states 
that community property includes "property acquired during the existence of the legal 
regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse." The plans were primarily 
funded with community property from Isaac's marriage to Dorothy as this period con-
sisted of thirty out of the thirty-six years Isaac worked for BellSouth. The funds used 
by Isaac to contribute to the pension plan after his remarriage to Sandra were also 
community funds because they consisted of property acquired during his marriage to 
Sandra. See id. 
35. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs u. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No. 
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997). Qualified plans are those in compliance with the re-
quirements of I.R.C. § 401 (1986). As an incentive to create and maintain plans meet-
ing the strict requirements established under the Code, private employer's receive tax 
deductions for contributions to such plans under I.R.C. § 404 (1986). Under I.R.C. § 
402 (1986) employees participating in qualified plans are not taxed on their contribu-
tions, including employer matching benefits received in connection with their partici-
pation, until actual receipt of the accrued benefits from the plan. Further, qualified 
plan earnings are allowed to accumulate free of income taxes in the trusts used to fund 
them under I.R.C. § 501(a) (1986). Pension plans, as opposed to welfare plans, must 
have a spendthrift provision to be "qualified" under the Internal Revenue Code. See id. 
36. See Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 463-64 (E.D. La. 1994). The lump-sum 
payment of $151,628.94 was rolled over into the IRA which was valued at $180,778.05 
on Isaac's death. Isaac made no withdrawals from the IRA during his life. Sandra was 
the designated beneficiary of this IRA at Isaac's death. See id. 
37. See Boggs v. Boggs, 89 F. 3d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1996). The Annuity provided 
monthly payments of $1,777.67 to Isaac from the date of his retirement until his death 
with the survivorship benefit continuing in Sandra's favor until her death. See id. 
38. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1758 (1997). 
39. See id. 
40. See id. 
5
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Dorothy's estate could claim such an interest even though the 
benefits did not become payable until Isaac's retirement be-
cause benefits accumulated during the community's existence 
constituted an "incorporeal, movable right.,141 
In addition, Dorothy bequeathed one-third of her commu-
nity property estate to Isaac outright and confirmed the re-
maining two-thirds in his favor as a lifetime usufruct.42 Ulti-
mately, under Louisiana law, the sons would receive naked 
ownership43 of the two-thirds usufruct interest on Isaac's 
41. T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So.2d 834, 851 (La. 1976). The court 
stated: 
The value of the right to share in the retirement ... funds is an incor-
poreal, movable right. When acquired during the existence of a mar-
riage, the right to share is a community asset which, at the dissolution 
of the community, must be so classified - even though at the time ac-
quired or at the time of dissolution of a community, ... the contractual 
right to receive money or other benefits is due in the future and is con-
tingent ... 
Id. 
42. See Boggs v. Boggs, 89 F.3d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1996). La. Civ. Code Ann. 
art. 535 (West 1996). Article 535 states: "Usufruct is a real right oflimited duration on 
the property of another. The features of the right vary with the nature of the things 
subject to it as consumables or nonconsumables." Id. 
Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1758 (1997). Usufruct is a Louisiana civil law con-
cept and is roughly the equivalent of a common law life estate. See id. 
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 538 (West 1996). Article 538 states that, at the termination 
of the usufruct, the usufructuary [holder of the usufructl of a consumable is "bound to 
pay the naked owner either the value that the things had at the commencement of the 
usufruct or deliver to him things of the same quantity or quality." Id. 
Brief for Respondents at 9, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-79). The 
testamentary clause in Dorothy's will states "I give and bequeath the maximum per-
mitted under the law to my beloved husband [Isaacl together with the lifetime usufruct 
over the balance." All of Dorothy's property on the date of her death, the date on which 
all of her rights are determined for the purposes of this case, was community property. 
See id. 
Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 463 (E.D. La. 1994). "Pursuant to Dorothy Boggs' 
will, Isaac Boggs, Jr. received one-third of her estate [outrightl and the lifetime usu-
fruct of the remaining two-thirds of the estate, whose naked ownership was inherited 
by [the sonsl." Id. 
43. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 478 (West 1996). Article 478 states: "The owner-
ship ofa thing burdened with a usufruct is designated as naked ownership." Id. 
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 477 (West 1996). Article 477 states: "Ownership is the right 
that confers on a person direct, immediate, and exclusive authority over a thing. The 
owner of a thing may use, enjoy, and dispose of it within the limits and under condi-
tions established by law." Id. 
Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1767 (1997). Naked ownership is roughly the 
equivalent of a common law remainder interest. See id. 
Brief for Respondents at 10-11, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-79). 
The sons were not expressly mentioned in their mother's will and succeed to a portion 
6
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death.44 In addition, under Louisiana succession laws, the sons 
were entitled to an accounting to settle their mother's commu-
nity property interest on their father's death.45 Such an ac-
counting would fIx: the amount of the residue the sons would 
receive in the form of the naked ownership interest.46 
On his death, Isaac bequeathed a lifetime usufruct47 to San-
dra in the property distributed to him from the pension plan 
with the naked ownership interest48 again held by the sons.49 
Subsequently, controversy arose between Sandra and the sons 
over ownership of the pension plan benefIts.50 Sandra claimed 
entitlement to Isaac's distributed plan benefIts under ERISA 
and the sons claimed entitlement to the naked ownership in-
terest in the benefIts in an amount attributable to their 
of her estate by operation of state law pursuant to the interaction between state law 
principles of usufruct and naked ownership. See id. 
44. See Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 463 (E.D. La. 1994). MPursuant to Doro-
thy Boggs' will, Isaac Boggs, Jr. received one-third of her estate [outrightl and the 
lifetime usufruct of the remaining two-thirds ofthe estate, whose naked ownership was 
inherited by [the sonsl." Id. 
45. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 538 (West 1996). See, Comment B regarding the 
duty of the usufructuary to render an accounting. 
See also, Brief for Respondents at 10-11, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 
96-79). The MJudgment of Possession" entered in the Succession of Dorothy Boggs (No. 
8627) in the 22nd Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Tammany, State of Lou-
isiana, on February 5, 1980 memorializes the existence of the naked ownership rights 
of the heirs according to state community property and succession laws. See id. 
Id. at 9. Accordingly, by operation of state law, the sons inherit a portion of their 
parents' estates. This portion cannot be decreased or eliminated by the parents except 
in certain limited circumstances not present here. The sons' interests, as heirs, vest at 
the time of Dorothy's death by operation of Louisiana law. See id. 
Id. at 9. A brief explanation of Louisiana community property and succession laws 
will help to fully understand the nature of the sons' claims and their interests in the 
benefits of their parents' community. Under the ancient law of Mseizin," the sons' 
vested rights provided them, by operation of law, with succession to their mother's 
community interest inheritance immediately on her death. At this time, the sons were 
entitled to possession, subject to their father's lifetime usufruct and distribution of the 
plan benefits, without any further court proceedings. See id. 
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 940 (West 1996). Article 940 states: MA succession is ac-
quired by the legal heir, who is called by law to the inheritance, immediately after the 
death of the deceased person to whom he succeeds." Id. 
46. See supra notes 42-45. 
47. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 535 (West 1996). 
48. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 478 (West 1996). 
49. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1758 (1997). 
50. See id. 
7
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mother's community interest.51 The value of the sons' claim 
would be determined through an accounting under Louisiana 
community property and succession laws.52 The disputed 
amount of the pension plan's value was substantial in relation 
to its total because Dorothy was married to Isaac for thirty out 
of the thirty-six years he participated in the plan.53 The ulti-
mate dispute arose, however, from the alleged conflict between 
ERISA and Louisiana community property and succession laws 
as applied to the disposition of the distributed pension plan 
benefits.54 
Sandra did not refute Dorothy's community property owner-
ship interest in the pension plan benefits under Louisiana 
law.55 She insisted, however, that ERISA preempted Louisiana 
community property law and governed the disposition of Isaac's 
distributed pension plan benefits, including the value of Doro-
thy's community interest therein.56 Sandra relied solely on 
ERISA's preemption provision to counter the sons' state law 
claims.57 
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On Isaac's death, the sons filed an action in Louisiana state 
court demanding an accounting of the value of their father's 
usufruct to determine the portion of the retirement benefits 
traceable to their mother, Dorothy's, community interest.58 
51. See id. at 1759. 
52. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2369 (West 1996). See Comment B stating Louisi-
ana community property law provides that at the tennination of the community re-
gime, each spouse owes to the other spouse (or when the community is terminated by 
the death of the spouse to his or her heirs or legatees), an accounting for community 
property under his or her control. (Emphasis added.) See id. 
53. See Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 464 (E.D. La. 1994). 
54. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1758-59 (1997). 
55. See Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 464 (E.D. La. 1994). 
56. See id. 
57. See id. 
58. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 33-34, Boggs v. Boggs, 
117 S. Ct. 1754,1774 (1997) (No. 96-79). The sons originally sought relief in the fonn 
of a percentage portion of the Annuity payments made to Isaac after his retirement and 
up to the date of his death, but later stipulated at oral argument that they sought only 
an accounting of the same. Such an accounting would provide a valuation of their 
8
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Based on this accounting, the sons sought a judgment award-
ing them a percentage of the Annuity payments received by 
their father, Isaac, during his retirement.59 Pursuant to the 
accounting, the sons also sought an award of a percentage of 
the Annuity payable to Sandra from the date of Isaac's death in 
addition to a percentage of the IRA and a portion of the ESOP 
shares.6o 
Pursuant to her rights as a named beneficiary under 
ERISA,61 Sandra filed a complaint in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.62 She sought a de-
claratory judgment that ERISA preempted Louisiana commu-
nity property law.63 Sandra also sought to establish her owner-
ship rights in the disputed benefits under ERISA and prevent 
Louisiana state law from diminishing her ownership interest 
mother's community interest in the benefits and Louisiana law would presumably 
allow the sons to recover other assets of equivalent value. 
See Succession of McVay v. McVay, 476 So.2d 1070, 1073-74 (La. App. 1985). An 
IRA containing community assets was not listed as an asset of decedent's estate be-
cause there was a designated beneficiary, but the estate was deemed to contain the 
equivalent cash value. See id. 
Hare v. Hodgins, 586 So.2d 118, 123 (La. 1991). A court may order that "cash or 
other property in lieu of an actual percentage of the pension payments" be paid in 
equalization of community assets on termination. See id. 
59. See Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 464 <E.D. La. 1994). 
60. See id. 
But see, United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 33-39, Boggs v. Boggs, 
117 S. Ct. 1754, 1774 (1997) (No. 96-79). Referring to the general question and answer 
discussion between the Justices and Respondents' counsel regarding the sons' claim 
and its relation to the Annuity proceeds both received by Isaac during retirement and 
payable to Sandra after his death. The sons stipulated at oral argument that although 
they prevailed on the claim for a portion of the survivor's annuity received and payable 
to Sandra in the Fifth Circuit they merely sought an accounting for the use of the prop-
erty. This accounting would determine the portion of the Annuity attributable to their, 
mother, Dorothy's community interest and fix their naked ownership award. Id. 
6!. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994). This section states: 
A civil action may be brought by a participant or beneficiary ... to re-
cover benefits due to him [or herl under the terms of [thel plan, to en-
force his [or herl rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his [or 
herl rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan ... 
Id. 
62. See Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 464 <E.D. La. 1994). 
63. See id. 
9
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by an amount attributable to Dorothy's testamentary disposi-
tion.64 
Sandra moved for summary judgment based on her alleged 
entitlement to the property under ERISA.65 The parties stipu-
lated to the facts and the district court rejected Sandra's mo-
tion and ruled in favor of the sons.66 The district court con-
cluded that ERISA did not preempt Louisiana community 
property and succession laws because Congress did not ex-
pressly intend ERISA to preempt such state laws that did not 
regulate private employee benefit plans within the meaning of 
ERISA's preemption provision.67 Since the Louisiana laws at 
issue did not directly relate to regulation of private pension 
plans within the meaning of ERISA's preemption provision, 
such laws did not substantially damage the federal regulatory 
interest and ERISA was held not controlling.68 
Sandra appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit.69 On April 17, 1996, the Fifth Circuit con-
firmed the district court's jurisdiction by holding that Sandra 
had standing as a beneficiary.70 After de novo review71 of the 
district court's preemption analysis, the appellate court af-
firmed the district court's ruling.72 The appellate court held 
that, despite ERISA's plenary authority in employment bene-
fits law and broad federal preemption power, ERISA did not 
preempt Louisiana community property and succession laws 
64. See id. 
65. See id. at 463. 
66. See id. 
67. See Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 465 (E.D. La. 1994). Despite its broad 
preemption provision, ERISA does not preempt state laws such as Louisiana's commu-
nity property laws which were not specifically designed to effect ERISA benefit plans. 
While such state laws may indirectly implicate an ERISA pension plan, they do not 
relate to an employee benefit plan to trigger ERISA's preemption provision. 1d. 
68. See id. at 465. "Application of Louisiana's community property law in this 
case will not do major damage to any federal interest, and thus, the Supremacy Clause 
does not require that the state law be overridden." 1d. at 466. 
69. See Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90, 94 (5th Cir. 1996). 
70. See id. 
See supra note 61 regarding actions which may be brought and remedies available 
under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994). 
71. See Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90, 94-95 (5th Cir. 1996). 
72. See id. at 98. 
10
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because the federal interest in regulating pension plans was 
not frustrated.73 
Judge Wiener, who did not participate in the Fifth Circuit 
panel's decision, voiced concern with the appellate court's 
holding74 and called for a poll of all active Fifth Circuit 
judges.75 Judge Wiener asked to rehear the case en banc based 
on the ruling's pervasive economic impact on all pension plan 
participants and spouses in their retirement years.76 The ma-
73. See id. Ruling per curiam, Judges Wisdom and Duhe affirmed stating that "a 
state community property system that affects what a plan participant does with his 
benefits after they are received does not impermissibly intrude on the mandates ERISA 
imposes on plan administrators." [d. at 96. Further, the court stated: 
This Court concludes that under the facts of this case, the Louisiana 
community property law is not sufficiently 'related to' an employee 
benefit plan to necessitate ERISA preemption ... Benefits will continue 
to be paid to the beneficiary in the manner provided in the plan. A 
spouse's accounting obligation under community property law affects 
employee benefit plans 'in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral' a manner 
to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan. Our decision 
relates not to the plan but to the disposition of the proceeds only after 
payment to the designated beneficiary. 
[d. at 96-97; citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). 
74. See Boggs v. Boggs, 89 F.3d 1169, 1170-71 (5th Cir. 1996). Judge Wiener was 
concerned over the pervasive impact of the majority's holding based on the following 
majority observations: 
Today, ... the preeminence and importance of pension plans and wel-
fare benefit plans in the lives of most Americans has grown exponen-
tially. With their combined assets totaling over 4.7 trillion dollars, em-
ployee benefit plans cover an estimated 54 million employees. In addi-
tion to its economic significance, [ERISA) plays a dominant role in 
present day jurisprudence as reflected, for example, by the unusually 
high number of ERISA cases for which the Supreme Court has granted 
writs in recent years. In sum, ERISA and employee benefit plans are 
ubiquitous and integral parts of our society. 
[d. 
75. See id. at 1170. 
76. See id. 
FED. R APP. P. 35(a) states: 
When Hearing or Rehearing in Banc Will Be Ordered: A majority of the 
circuit judges who are in regular active service may order that an ap-
peal or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of appeals en 
banco Such a hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not 
be honored except (1) when consideration by the full court is necessary 
to secure and maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2) when the pro-
ceeding involves a question of exceptional importance. 
[d. 
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jority of the Fifth Circuit judges, however, refused to rehear the 
case.77 
Although Sandra bypassed filing a motion for rehearing en 
bane, she appealed the Fifth Circuit's judgment by writ of cer-
tiorari to the United States Supreme Court.78 Sandra claimed 
that the Fifth Circuit's ruling usurped her rights under ERISA 
as the surviving spouse of a pension plan participant.79 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari8o largely due to Fifth and 
Ninth Circuit conflict.al The circuits conflicted over whether 
ERISA preempted state law that allowed for the testamentary 
disposition of a nonparticipant spouse's community property 
interest in pension plan benefits after distribution from a quali-
fied plan.82 
On June 2,1997, the United States Supreme Court reversed 
the Fifth Circuit and held that ERISA preempted Louisiana 
community property and succession laws and prohibited opera-
tion of state law from effecting the sons' inheritance.83 
77. See Boggs v. Boggs, 89 F.3d 1169, 1170 (5th Cir. 1996). Circuit Judge Wiener 
dissented to the per curiam opinion's denial of an en banc rehearing. He was joined in 
this dissent by Chief Judge Politz and Judges King, Benavides, Stewart and Parker. 
78. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996). 
79. See id. 
80. See id. 
81. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (1997). 
82. See id. 
Compare Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1996) with Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F. 
2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991). 
83. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1755, 1759, 1767 (1997). The Justices 
ruled seven to two in favor of ERISA preemption of Louisiana state laws allowing for 
the testamentary disposition of a nonparticipant spouse's interest in the Annuity. The 
Justices ruled five to four in favor of ERISA preemption of the state law testamentary 
disposition of all other benefits. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion was joined by 
Justices Scalia, Souter, Stevens and Thomas. Justice Breyer wrote the dissenting 
opinion in which Justice O'Connor joined and Justice Ginsberg and Chief Justice 
Rehnquistjoined in part. See id. 
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IV. BACKGROUND 
A. REGULATION OF PRIVATE PENSION PLANS PRIOR TO ERISA 
Private pension and welfare plans are relatively modern 
economic institutions which have steadily increased in popu-
larity as a means of providing for one's retirement security.84 
The growth and development of the private pension system has 
been substantial since its inception in the mid-1940's and today 
the assets of private employee benefits plans constitute the 
largest private accumulation of funds in the United States.85 
Congress did not enact federal regulation of private pension 
and welfare plans until the enactment of the Welfare and Pen-
sion Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 ("1958 Act").86 Congress en-
acted the 1958 Act to protect the rights and interests of plan 
participants and their beneficiaries.87 This protection would be 
achieved through the plan's required disclosure of information 
to the participants and beneficiaries, theoretically, enabling 
those parties to monitor the performance of their plans.88 Since 
the 1958 Act was primarily a disclosure statute, however, it 
lacked an effective enforcement mechanism.89 Thus, under 
most circumstances, plan administrators and fiduciaries could 
not be held responsible under federal law for any unlawful ac-
tivity or mismanagement of employee pension funds.90 
In 1962, Congress amended the 1958 Act ("1962 Amend-
ment") to address improper management of plan assets by plan 
administrators and fiduciaries.91 The 1962 Amendment made 
84. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 4640 (1973). 
85. See id. at 4641. 
See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1760 (1997) (the participant residents of the 
nine community property states alone have perhaps $1 trillion in private retirement 
plans). 
86. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 4641 (1973). 
87. See id. at 4642. 
88. See id. 
89. See id. at 4641-42. 
90. See id. 
91. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 4641-42 (1973). Examples of such manage-
rial improprieties included theft and embezzlement of plan assets which caused plans 
to lose all of their assets prior to distribution to participants and beneficiaries entitled 
13
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certain acts federal crimes if committed in connection with 
pension plan administration and conferred some regulatory 
and investigatory authority on the Secretary of Labor.92 Con-
gress intended these changes to provide the Secretary of Labor 
with enhanced enforcement power in this area.93 The 1962 
Amendment, however, did not accomplish the regulatory pro-
tection that Congress intended because it lacked substantive 
fiduciary standards and required only limited disclosure.94 As 
a result, the 1962 Amendment continued to be largely ineffec-
tive in meeting Congress' primary goal of providing retirement 
income securitl5 because continued mismanagement and un-
sound planning by pension plan administrators and fiduciaries 
caused many workers and their dependents to be deprived of 
the intended protection.96 
Ineffective federal regulation was further hampered by non-
uniform and, often contradictory, state laws that also regulated 
employee benefit plans in the state in which the plan was being 
administered.97 State regulation only compounded misman-
agement by creating confusion among plan administrators and 
fiduciaries due to the non-uniform regulatory schemes.98 
B. ERISA's PuRPOSE 
In 1974, Congress again recognized that private pension 
plans were emerging as the most important vehicle by which 
United States workers could provide post-retirement financial 
security for themselves, their spouses and their dependents.99 
to the lost benefits. Fiduciary improprieties such as these were made punishable as 
federal crimes under the 1962 Amendment. See id. 
92. See id. 
93. See id. 
94. See id. 
95. See id. "Experience in the decade since the passage of the amendments has 
demonstrated the inadequacy of the [1958 Act, as amended) in regulating the private 
pension system for the purpose of protecting rights and benefits due to workers." [d. at 
4642. 
96. See H.R. REP. NO. 533, 93d Cong., 4641 (1973). 
97. See id. 
98. See id. at 4650. 
99. See id. at 4641. 
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In response to this continually developing trend and public 
concern over prior ineffective regulatory control,t°o Congress 
enacted ERISA.lol The purpose of ERISA was to establish a 
uniform system of law to govern employee benefit plans and 
distributions and to protect the rights and interests of plan 
participants and their beneficiaries.lo2 
Compare Philip H. Wile, Boggs v. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No. 
5 TAX NOTES 679 (1997). The two other primary sources of post-retirement economic 
subsistence are the benefits received from The Old Age, Survivors and Disability In-
surance Program, commonly referred to as social security, and private savings. In 
most situations these sources do not provide adequate security for the retired person, 
let alone spouses and dependents. This inadequacy has lead to the increased reliance 
on benefits from private retirement plans to provide for the means necessary to main-
tain a standard ofliving as close as possible to one's pre-retirement level. See id. 
100. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 4639-43 (1973). 
101. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. 1997). Congress enacted ERISA under 
its Commerce Clause powers. The laws enacted under ERISA became effective on 
January 1, 1975. See id. 
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. "Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce . 
. . among the several States.' [d. 
102. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 4639, 4642, 4647-48 (1973). The report 
stated: 
The primary purpose of the bill is the protection of individual pension 
rights ... Underlying the provisions of this Act is the recognition of a 
necessity for a comprehensive legislative program dealing not only with 
the malfeasance and maladministration in the plans, ... but ... in 
short, the establishment of certain minimum standards to which all 
private pension plans must conform if the private pension promise is to 
become real rather than illusory. 
[d. at 4639, 4647-48. 
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994). Section 1001(b) states: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect inter-
state commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit 
plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting 
to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with 
respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, 
and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by provid-
ing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal 
courts. 
[d. 
29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1994). Section 1003(a) states that ERISA's coverage 
shall apply to: 
[A)ny employee benefit plan if it is established or maintained - (1) by 
any employer engaged in commerce or in an industry or activity affect-
ing commerce; or (2) by any employee organization or organizations 
representing employees engaged in commerce or in any industry or ac-
tivity affecting commerce; or (3) by both. 
[d. 
15
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C. ERISA's PREEMPTION PROVISION 
Congress expressly intended ERISA to preempt state laws 
relating to private employee benefit plans.103 ERISA's preemp-
tion provision enables the statute to effectively and exclusively 
regulate private employee benefit plans.104 This provision 
states that" [e]xcept as provided ... the provisions of this sub-
chapter . . . shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as 
they may now or hereinafter relate to any employee benefit 
plan ... ,,105 To further this objective, ERISA sets forth specific 
standards and procedures for pension plan administrators to 
ensure that participants and beneficiaries receive their bene-
fits. loS Accordingly, the statute requires plan administrators 
and fiduciaries to act solely in the interests of participants and 
beneficiaries. lo7 Entitlement to plan benefits is based on the 
premise that only participantsl08 and their beneficiarieslo9 have 
a claim of right to such benefits.llo 
ERISA's preemption provision, however, does not specifi-
cally indicate an express intent to preempt areas of traditional 
state concern not directly related to the regulation of employee 
benefit plans.lll The clause is silent on the testamentary dis-
103. See supra note 14 for the text of 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). 
See also, Brooks v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 477 U.S. 903 (1986). Congress enacted 
ERISA with broad preemptive powers to ensure the uniformity of pension plan law by 
eliminating conflicting state laws. See id. 
104. See supra note 102, citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994), for ERISA's stated pur-
pose. 
105. See supra note 14 for the text of29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). 
106. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 4639-40, 4656-59 (1973). 
107. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c)(1994). 
108. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1994). A "participant" is defmed as "any employee or 
former employee ... who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from 
an employee benefit plan .... " [d. 
109. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1994). A "beneficiary" is defmed as one "designated by 
a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become enti-
tled to a benefit thereunder." [d. 
110. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994). Section 1132(a)(1)(B) states: 
A civil action may be brought by - (1) a participant or beneficiary ... to 
recover benefits due to him [or her) under the terms of [the) plan, to en-
force his [or her) rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his [or 
her) rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan ... 
[d. 
111. See supra note 14 for the text of ERISA's preemption provision. 
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position of pension plan benefits on the death of a nonpartici-
pant spouse who is the domicilliary of a community property 
state.U2 
D. ERISA's SPENDTHRIFT PROVISION 
ERISA's spendthrift provision prohibits most transfers of 
the right to receive pension plan benefits and prevents the as-
signment and alienation of plan benefits by plan participants 
and beneficiaries.1l3 This provision applies only to pension 
plan benefits and states that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide 
that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or 
alienated."u4 Whether this spendthrift provision prevents the 
transfer of such rights solely to unrelated third parties or 
whether it also bars the apportionment of pension plan benefits 
to nonemployee spouses or to their estates and heirs on death 
has been a subject of judicial debate.u5 The Boggs holding pre-
vents the estate of a nonemployee spouse from claiming a 
community interest in pension plan benefits and is sufficiently 
broad to have settled this debate regarding the meaning of 
ERISA's spendthrift provision.u6 
E. PREEMPI'ION, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND ERISA's SILENT 
STRENGTH 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution 
vests Congress with the power to enact legislation to establish 
areas of exclusive federal control and to preempt the states' 
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). ERISA's preemption provision 
should be read to have a pre-emptive reach as broad as its language in that "[aJ law 
'relates to' [under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)J an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of 
the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan." Id. 
112. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). This clause states that "[eJxcept as provided .. 
. the provisions of this subchapter ... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as 
they may now or hereinafter relate to any employee benefit plan ... " Id. 
113. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(l) (1994). 
114. Id. 
115. See Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1996). The court held in favor of state 
community property and succession laws. See id. 
But see, Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991). The court held in favor of 
ERISA preemption of state community property law in the testamentary context. See 
id. 
116. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1765-66 (1997). 
17
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power to legislate within those areas.ll7 Thus, despite the sub-
stantive nature of state marital property and succession laws, 
Congress has the constitutional power to preempt such laws by 
direct legislative action118 limiting a state's authority over the 
property rights of its domicilliaries.ll9 To find in favor of fed-
eral statutory preemption, however, courts must determine 
that federal and state laws conflict and that Congress clearly 
intended the usurpation· of state law.120 Where ambiguityex-
ists, this determination must weigh the nature of the state in-
terest against the goals of the federallegislation.l21 
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted ERISA's 
preemption provision broadly with respect to the provision's 
inherent preemptive power in finding that ERISA preempts 
117. See U.S. CONST. art.VI, c1.2. The Supremacy Clause states: 
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby; 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
[d. 
Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1459 (9th Cir. 1991); citing, as authority, Ridgway v. 
Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1981). State family property laws that conflict with fed-
erallaws will be overridden pursuant to the Supremacy Clause because: 
The relative importance to the State of its own law is not material 
where there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our 
Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail ... That prin-
ciple is but the necessary consequence of the Supremacy Clause of our 
National Constitution. 
[d. 
See also, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Any state law con-
trary to a law of Congress is invalidated by the Supremacy Clause. [d.; 
Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981). 
The Court must find for preemption where state law conflicts with Congres-
sionallegislation validly enacted pursuant to its Constitutional powers. [d. 
118. See supra note 117. 
119. See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 670 (1962). The Court held that Federal law 
preempted a conflicting state law in the determination of joint ownership rights to 
United States savings bonds. See id. 
120. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1990) (discussion of Congres-
sional intent regarding the enforcement of ERISA's preemptive powers and fmding 
that Congress intended to ensure that only federal law governed pension plans). 
See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,525-26 (1977) (Congress' intent to leg-
islate within a particular sphere reflects intent to preempt all state laws in that field). 
121. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1990). 
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state law in most areas of debate.122 ERISA's broadly stated 
preemption provision123 ensures an equally broad application 
by the courts in reaction to a conflict with state laws that effec-
tively regulate qualified pension plans.124 However, the provi-
sion is silent as to its application to state community property 
laws that do not specifically relate to regulating such plans.125 
In judicial decisions, state community property laws have 
been preempted by ERISA or held to control dependent upon 
the state law connection with or relation to the federallegisla-
tion's purpose.126 The United States Supreme Court has held 
that state law must do major damage to clear and substantial 
122. See Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137-39 (1990) (Congress in-
tended ERISA's preemption provision to be interpreted broadly and past decisions by 
the Court applied preemption to prevent conflicts between federal and state regulation 
of pension plans in a wide variety of circumstances). See id. 
123. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). This clause states that "[e1xcept as provided .. 
. the provisions of this subchapter ... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as 
they may now or hereinafter relate to any employee benefit plan .... " [d. 
124. See Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1996). The Boggs Court, citing 
Hook v. Morrison Milling Co., 38 F.3d 776, 781 (5th Cir. 1994), stated that "[c10urts 
recognize the 'deliberately expansive language chosen by Congress.'" [d. 
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60 (1990). Congress intended ERISA's preemp-
tion provision as a means of ensuring that only one body of law would govern employee 
benefit plans - "[t10 require plan providers to design their programs in an environment 
of differing state regulations would complicate the administration of nationwide plans, 
producing inefficiencies that employers might offset with decreased benefits." [d. 
125. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). ERISA's preemption provision contains no ex-
press reference to state community property laws. See id. 
126. See Free v. Bland 369 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1962). Treasury regulations providing 
for the survivor's ownership of United States savings bonds preempt conflicting state 
law; despite the fact that the bonds were purchased with community funds. See id. 
But see, Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 835-36 
(1988). The Court held that Congress did not intend to preempt state law garnishment 
of an ERISA welfare benefit, even though the purpose of the garnishment was to collect 
a judgment against a plan participant. See id. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739-40 (1985). The Court 
held that state laws requiring minimum coverage in insurance policies purchased by 
employee plans regulated by ERISA were not preempted because the state law regu-
lates insurance and, thus, is expressly exempt by ERISA See id. 
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994). The exception to ERISA's preemption clause relied 
on by the Metropolitan Court states that nothing in ERISA "shall be construed to ex-
empt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance .... " 
[d. 
Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1276 (6th Cir. 1991). 
This court held against preemption because the state law's effect on the ERISA gov-
erned plan was too remote. See id. 
19
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federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will demand 
that the state law be preempted.127 
Generally, courts have applied one of three theories to re-
solve conflict between federal and state law.l28 Under the pro-
hibited relation theory, ERISA preempts all state laws that 
include a reference to ERISA governed plans due to the obvious 
regulatory conflict.129 Under the prohibited connection theory, 
ERISA preempts all conflicting state laws, even those consis-
tent with its own goals.130 Under the tangential relation the-
ory, however, courts have held that ERISA does not preempt 
state laws which have "merely tenuous, remote or peripheral" 
effects on qualified benefit plans because the state law impact 
does not rise to the level of a conflict.l31 Thus, the Court has 
recognized that preemption is not warranted where a state law 
tangentially conflicts with ERISA.132 In addition, the Court 
has prohibited preemption where ERISA's language is silent on 
a state procedural matter.133 
127. See United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966). 
128. See infra notes 129-31. 
129. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). ERISA's preemption 
provision should be read to have a pre-emptive reach as broad as its language in that 
"[allaw 'relates to' [under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)1 an employee benefit plan, in the normal 
sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan." Id. 
130. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985). 
("The pre-emption provision was intended to displace all state laws that fall within its 
sphere, even including state laws that are consistent with ERISA's substantive re-
quirements. "). 
131. Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1276 (6th Cir. 
1991). 
132. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 100 (1983). Citing, as authority, 
AT&T v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1979), the Court refused to preempt a state 
garnishment law providing for satisfaction of alimony and child support awards. See 
id. 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1989); cert. denied 493 
U.S. 811 (1989). State laws survived preemption because they were laws of "general 
application - often traditional exercises of state power or regulatory authority - whose 
effect on ERISA plans is incidental." Id. 
133. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 835-838 
(1988). The Court upheld application of a state garnishment law to ERISA governed 
welfare plan benefits because ERISA was silent on state garnishment procedures. See 
id. 
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F. PROPERTY OWNERSHIP PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY 
PROPERTY MARITAL REGIMES 
591 
Nine states apply the community property system to owner-
ship of property between husband and wife.134 The primary 
goal of the present community property systems is equal 
treatment of the spouses by regarding marriage as a partner-
ship to which both members contribute equally.135 Under this 
system, property rights are determined by the manner and 
timing of the property's acquisition.13G The community consists 
of all property acquired through the skill or efforts of either 
spouse during marriage.137 Generally, community property law 
provides each spouse ~ith present ownership of an undivided 
134. See WILLIAM Q. DE FuNlAK AND MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 2D EDITION 1 (1971). The community property states compris-
ing the minority are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas 
and Washington. These states have adopted community property principles with ori-
gins traceable to variations of the Spanish community property regime. See id. 
W.S. McCLANAHAN, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAw IN THE UNITED STATES - 1992 
SUPPLEMENT 310 (1982 & SUPP. 1992). Wisconsin adopted the Uniform Marital Prop-
erty Act in 1984 to be effective January I, 1986. See id. 
135. See WILLIAM Q. DE FuNIAK AND MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 2D EDITION 2-3 (1971). The authors state: 
Equality is the cardinal precept of the community property system. At 
the foundation of this concept is the principle that all wealth acquired 
by the joint efforts of the husband and wife shall be common property; 
the theory of the law being that, with respect to marital property acqui-
sitions, the marriage is a community of which each spouse is a member, 
equally contributing by his or her industry to its prosperity, and pos-
sessing an equal right to succeed to the property after dissolution. 
[d. 
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2325 (West 1996). Article 2325 states that a mat-
rimonial regime creates a system of property ownership and management 
between married persons and toward third persons. See id. 
136. See WILLIAM Q. DE FuNIAK AND MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 2D EDITION 2 (1971). "All property which [the spouses) possess 
is presumed to be held and owned by them in common unless or until it is proved to be 
the separate property of one of them." Thus, property acquired during the union is 
presumed to be community property. (Emphasis added.) "This presumption has gen-
erally been continued in our community property states as to property possessed or 
acquired during the marriage or in possession of the spouses at the time of the dissolu-
tion of the marriage .... " [d. at 117. 
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2338 (West 1996). Article 2338 states that community prop-
erty includes "property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through the 
effort, skill, or industry of either spouse .... " [d. 
137. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2338 (West 1996). 
See WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK AND MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY 
PROPERTY 2D EDITION 2 (1971). 
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one-half interest in the property of the community.138 Both 
spouses possess the testamentary power to transfer their re-
spective half of the community at death.l39 
All property acquired during marriage, except that acquired 
by gift, inheritance, bequest or devise is presumed to be com-
munity property irrespective of individual contribution.t4o 
Property acquired before marriage is presumed to be the sepa-
rate property of each spouse.l4l Generally, title is not determi-
native of ownership of property acquired during marriage.t42 
Thus, what may appear to be the separate property of one 
spouse, is generally presumed to be community property until 
the presumption is rebutted.143 ,. 
138. See id. at 261-62. 
See also, La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2336 (West 1996). Article 2336 states: 
Each spouse owns a present undivided one-half interest in the commu-
nity property. Nevertheless, neither the community nor the things of 
the community may be judicially partitioned prior to the termination of 
the regime. During the existence of the community property regime, 
the spouses may, without court approval, voluntarily partition the 
community property in whole or part. In each case, the things that 
each spouse acquires are separate property. 
Id. 
139. See WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK AND MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 2D EDITION 459 (1971). Community property law allows each 
spouse to transfer his or her community interest to heirs and devisees at death. See id. 
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2346 (West 1996). Article 2346 states that "[elach spouse 
acting alone may manage, control, or dispose of community property unless otherwise 
provided by law." Id. 
140. See WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK AND MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 2D EDITION 117-20 (1971). 
141. See id. at 2, 129-31. 
142. See id. at 117-19. 
See Nilson v. Sarment, 96 P. 315 (Cal. 1908). The presumption that property ac-
quired during marriage is community property, despite title ownership in one spouse's 
name, is rebuttable. However, if the presumption is not rebutted, the property is con-
sidered community property. See id. 
143. See Nilson v. Sarment, 96 P. 315 (Cal. 1908). 
See Loutnitsky v. Loutnitsky, 266 P.2d 910, 914 (Cal. 1954). Under some circum-
stances, title taken in the one spouse's name may be sufficient to rebut the presump-
tion, however, title taken in such a manner does not conclusively establish separate 
ownership rights. See id. 
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During marriage, spouses may transmutel44 community as-
sets into the separate property of either spouse, or vice-versa, 
to defeat or reinforce the community property presumption, as 
desired. 145 Transmutation is accomplished by either declaring 
certain assets to be separate property or community property 
or agreeing to voluntarily partition community property, in 
whole or in part.146 Generally, a writing specifically memori-
alizing the spouses' intent to change the characterization of 
specified property is required.147 
G. THE RETIREMENl' EQUITY ACT OF 1984148 AND THE 
QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER149 
Congress initially responded to conflicts between ERISA 
and state property and domestic relations laws by amending 
ERISA under the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 ("REA").150 
Specifically, REA addressed ERISA's failure to recognize the 
property rights of the nonemployee spouse or dependent chil-
144. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 2D 
COLLEGE EDITION (1984). Defmition of transmute: "to change from one form ... into 
another; transfonn; convert." ld. 
145. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2336 (West 1996). Article 2336 states: "During 
the existence of the community property regime, the spouses may, without court ap-
proval, voluntarily partition the community property in whole or part. In each case, 
the things that each spouse acquires are separate property." ld. 
146. See WILLIAM Q. DE FuNIAK AND MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 2D EDITION 116 (1971). 
147. See id. 
148. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, PUB.L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984). This 
amendment to ERISA applies to plan years after December 31, 1984. ld. at 1451. 
149. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) (1994). "[Tlhe tenn 'qualified domestic relations 
order' means a domestic relations order - which creates or recognizes the existence of 
an alternate payee's right to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or 
a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan .... " ld. 
150. ld. 
S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2547 (1984). Congress directed its attention to the eq-
uitable resolution of marital dissolution and dependent support issues with respect to 
the disposition of ERISA plan benefits. See id. 
See also, Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d 740,748-49 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., 
Seafarer's Union v. Stone, 453 U.S. 922 (1981). The Court refused preemption of state 
community property laws which awarded a divorced wife of a participant an interest in 
her husband's ERISA regulated pension plan. See id. 
But see, Francis v. United Tech. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978). The court 
held in favor of preemption in a divorce centered context which prevented state com-
munity property law from permitting attachment of plan benefits for family support 
purposes. See id. at 87-88. 
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dren on termination of the marriage through divorce by creat-
ing the qualified domestic relations order.l5l Accordingly, REA 
includes a statutory exception to ERISA's spendthrift provision 
designated as the qualified domestic relations order 
("QDRO,,)152 that is primarily designed to protect the nonem-
ployee spouse's economic interest in pension plan benefits on 
divorce.153 A QDR0154 protects the right of an alternate payee, 
a third party that is neither a pension plan participant nor a 
named beneficiary but is often the nonemployee spouse, to re-
ceive ERISA regulated plan benefits payable to a participant or 
beneficiary under a plan.155 
REA established guidelines for plan administrators to follow 
in determining whether this limited exception to the spend-
151. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1991). 
S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2565 (1984). "There is a divergence of opinion among 
the courts as to whether ERISA preempts State community property laws insofar as 
they relate to the rights of a married couple to benefits under a pension, etc., plan." 
[d., citing, as authority, Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub 
nom., Seafarer's Union v. Stone, 453 U.S. 922 (1981). 
But see, Francis v. United Tech. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978). 
See also, Brief for Estate Planning Trust and Probate Law Section of the State Bar 
of California as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. 
Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-79). The divergence of opinion among the courts regarding 
ERISA preemption of state community property laws recognized by Congress in the 
record cites the Stone and Francis cases as the only specific examples of this diver-
gence. Both of these cases involved a determination of ERISA preemption of spousal 
community property rights exclusively within the divorce context. Thus, by the evi-
dence in the Congressional legislative record, the debate Congress sought to settle 
through the enactment of REA was purely within the context of marriage dissolution 
by divorce. Debate concerning conflicting testamentary rights bestowed on nonpartici-
pant spouses under ERISA and state community property and succession laws was not 
recognized and had yet to become an issue of divergent opinion among the courts. 
Based purely on the cited evidence of Stone and Francis in the record as Congress' 
basis for amending ERISA, there was no actual "divergence" at the time REA was 
being discussed and drafted since the Stone decision in effect overruled the Francis 
holding because it came down roughly two years later and was issued by the circuit 
court, a superior judicial body. See id. 
152. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (1994). ERISA's spendthrift provision shall not ap-
ply to qualified domestic relations orders. See id. 
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(1) (1994). "[Tlhe term 'qualified domestic relations or-
der' means a domestic relations order - which creates or recognizes the existence of an 
alternate payee's right to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a 
portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan ... " [d. 
153. See supra note 150-51 regarding the purposes of enacting REA. 
154. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(1) (1994). 
155. See id. 
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thrift provision applies.156 Though Congress did not enact REA 
to apply community ownership to pension plan benefits, the 
text of REA contains terms suggesting that it utilizes commu-
nity property principles.157 Congress, however, enacted REA 
primarily to provide the legislative framework within which to 
equitably distribute pension plan benefits between participant 
and nonparticipant spouses on divorce.l58 Congress did not 
intend to directly apply principles of community ownership but 
created the QDRO to allow for equitable marital property divi-
sion on dissolution based on a state divorce decree.159 
H. ERISA IN THE COURTS - CIRCUITS SPLIT 
The Court granted certiorari in BoggsI60 primarily because 
the Federal Fifth and Ninth Circuits were split on issues re-
lated to state community property and testamentary rights un-
der ERISA.16I The split was created when the Fifth Circuit 
upheld the testamentary disposition of a community interest in 
ERISA pension plan benefits in accordance with Louisiana 
community property and succession laws in Boggs v. Boggs. 162 
.The Fifth Circuit's decision was contrary to the Ninth Circuit's 
ruling in Ablamis v. Roperl63 which held in favor of ERISA pre-
emption of California community property laws on similar, yet 
156. See S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2565 (1984). "In order to provide rational 
rules for plan administrators, the committee believes it is necessary to establish guide-
lines for determining whether the exception to the spendthrift rules applies." [d. 
157. See id. at 2547. Congress' purpose in enacting REA is "to improve the delivery 
of retirement benefits and provide for greater equity under private pension plans for 
workers and their spouses and dependents by taking into account changes in work 
patterns, the status of marriage as an economic partnership, and the substantial contri-
bution to that partnership of spouses who work both in and outside the home . .. " (Em-
phasis added.) [d. 
158. See id. 
159. See id. 
160. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997). 
161. See id. at 1759. "The reasoning and holding of the Fifth Circuit's decision 
[Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1996)] is in substantial conflict with the decision 
of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450 (9th 
Cir. 1991) ... [T]he division between the Circuits is significant .... " The Court attrib-
uted the significance to the community property systems in place within seven states 
in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits combined. See id. 
162. Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90, 98 (5th Cir. 1996). 
163. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450 (9th eir. 1991). 
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distinguishable, facts. l64 Ultimately, in Boggs/65 the United 
States Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and, in effect, 
affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling.166 The Boggsl67 Court held 
that ERISA preempted Louisiana community property and 
succession laws.l68 This holding prevented the heirs' inheri-
tance of a nonemployee spouse's community interest in pension 
plan benefits.169 The Court reasoned that Congress intended 
ERISA to preempt such laws in areas of traditional state leg-
islative concern/70 thereby, preempting Louisiana state law 
from governing the testamentary disposition of community 
property.l71 
1. THE NINTH CIRCUIT CASE - ABLAMIS V. ROPERl72 
Ablamisl73 is the leading case cited by the Boggs174 Court 
involving ERISA preemption of state community property law 
in a testamentary context.175 In Ablamis, the Ninth Circuit 
held that ERISA preempted California community property 
law that provided a predeceasing nonparticipant spouse with a 
testamentary power over a community interest in the partici-
pant spouse's plan benefits.176 Preemption of state community 
164. See id. at 1460 
165. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1767 (1997). 
166. See id. 
167. [d. 
168. See id. 
169. See id. 
170. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968). "The several States ... have 
traditionally regulated the descent and distribution of estates." [d. 
California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 117 S. Ct. 
832, 838 (1997), quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
When considering preemption, the Court assumes "that the historic police powers of 
the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress." [d. 
171. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997). 
172. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991). 
173. [d. 
174. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (1997). 
175. See id. 
176. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450,1452 (9th Cir. 1991). The court stated: 
We are asked to decide here whether a wife who dies while her husband 
is still living may leave half of his current or future pension benefits to 
a third party in her will. We hold that an employee whose pension in-
terests are covered by ERISA may not be divested of his entitlement. 
[d. 
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property and succession laws in Ablamis prohibited the distri-
bution of benefits directly to third parties who were neither 
participants nor beneficiaries under the terms of the pension 
plan. 177 The court reasoned that holding in favor of state law 
would have contravened Congress' intent to provide a stream of 
income to the participant survivor during life.178 In upholding 
preemption, the Ablamis court ruled against the highest courts 
of three community property states.179 Each of these high state 
courts provided the nonparticipant spouse with testamentary 
control over a community property share of the participant 
spouse's pension plan benefits or accounts consisting of distrib-
uted plan proceeds.180 
The facts of Ablamis concerned a married couple whose 
marital property was subject to California community property 
laws.18l Roger and Glee Ablamis ("Mr. Ablamis" and "Ms. 
Ablamis") were married from August 6, 1972 until Ms. 
Ablamis' death on February 1, 1988.182 On Ms. Ablamis death, 
Mr. Ablamis was a vested participant in employee benefit 
profit sharing plans subject to ERISA regulation.183 Mr. 
Ablamis participated in the plans throughout the duration of 
the marriage. l84 
177. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450,1455 (9th Cir. 1991). 
178. See id. at 1457, 1459. The majority's opinion, in its closing paragraph, states 
that this distinction makes no difference because, under operation of state law, the 
sons' claims are based on the theory that their interest is derived from the undistrib-
uted benefits. See id. 
179. See Brief for Estate Planning Trust and Probate Law Section of the State Bar 
of California as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 
1754 (1997) (No. 96-79). 
Estate of MacDonald, 794 P.2d 911 (Cal. 1990) (the predeceased nonparticipant 
spouse was allowed testamentary control over a community property interest in dis-
tributed pension plan benefits deposited into IRA accounts). 
Allard v. Frech, 754 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. 1988) (the predeceased nonparticipant 
spouse's estate was held to include community property interest in the participant 
spouse's retirement plan benefits). 
Farver v. Department of Retirement Sys., 644 P.2d 1149 (Wash. 1982) (pensions are 
subject to state community property laws). 
180. See supra note 179. 
181. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1991). 
182. See id. 
183. See id. 
184. See id. 
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On her death, Ms. Ablamis' will left the majority of her es-
tate "including [her] one-half (112) community property interest 
in all community assets" to two trustS.185 One trust was for the 
direct benefit of her children from a previous marriage and the 
other trust was for Mr. Ablamis' lifetime maintenance with the 
remainder interest passing to the same children.186 On her 
death, Ms. Ablamis' estate claimed a community property in-
terest in Mr. Ablamis' vested rights in the pension plan bene-
fits. 187 Whereupon, the trustee of the plan filed a summary 
judgment motion seeking declaratory relief prohibiting Ms. 
Ablamis' estate from entitlement to any interest in Mr. 
Ablamis' pension benefits.lss The executrix of Ms. Ablamis' 
estate filed a cross motion for summary judgment claiming en-
titlement to the estate's statutory one-half community property 
interest in Mr. Ablamis' pension benefits.189 The trustee's 
claim was based on ERISA preemption of conflicting state law, 
while the estate claimed entitlement to the pension plan bene-
fits under California community property laws.190 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the plan trustee and held that ERISA preempts California 
community property laws to the extent that the state laws al-
Iowa nonparticipant spouse to bequeath a community property 
interest in the participant spouse's pension plan benefits.l91 
The executrix of the estate appealed and the Ninth Circuit held 
that ERISA preempted state community property laws and 
prohibited a predeceasing nonparticipant spouse from pos-
sessing a testamentary interest in the fully vested pension 
benefits, current or prospective, of a surviving participant 
spouse.192 Further, the Ninth Circuit held that state court pro-
bate orders effecting testamentary transfers were not QDROs 
185. See id. 
186. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1991). 
187. See id. 
188. See id. 
189. See id. 
190. See id. 
191. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1991). 
192. See id. at 1460 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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and, thus, were not excepted from ERISA's spendthrift provi-
sion.193 
v. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS OF 
BOGGS v. BOGGS 
ERISA's preemption provision states that "[e]xcept as pro-
vided ... the provisions of this subchapter ... shall supersede 
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereinafter 
relate to any employee benefit plan ... "194 The United States 
Supreme Court, however, did not interpret the meaning of the 
"relate to" element within the text ERISA's preemption provi-
sion.195 Instead, the Court applied conventional preemption 
principles to find preemption of Louisiana community property 
laws because the state laws conflicted with ERISA's purpose.1OO 
In support of its holding, the Court found that testamentary 
transfers allowed under Louisiana law could effectively reduce 
the amount payable under the Annuity to below the statutory 
minimum197 thereby frustrating ERISA's purpose of providing 
a stream of income to the surviving spouse.198 The Court held 
that ERISA preempted Louisiana state law and denied the 
sons' claims to any interest in the distributed benefits.l99 
193. See id. at 1459-60. 
194. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). 
195. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1760-61 (1997). 
We can begin, and in this case end, the analysis by simply asking if 
state law conflicts with the provisions of ERISA or operates to frustrate 
its objects. We hold that there is a conflict, which suffices to resolve 
the case. We need not inquire whether the statutory phrase 'relate to' 
provides further additional support for the pre-emption claim. 
[d. 
196. See id. at 1760-62 (1997). The Court stated that "conventional pre-emption 
principles require pre-emption of state law 'where compliance with both federal and 
state law is a physical impossibility ... or where state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective of Congress.'" [d. at 
1762; citing Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n., 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). 
197. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(d)(l) (1994). The survivor's annuity shall not be less 
than 50% of the annuity which is payable during Ule joint lives of the participant and 
spouse. See id. 
198. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1762 (1997). "In the face of this direct 
clash between state law and ERISA's provisions and objectives, the state law cannot 
stand." [d. 
199. See id. at 1767. 
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A. CASES DECIDED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 
RETIREMENT EQUITY ACT OF 1984200 ARE No LONGER 
APPLICABLE 
Maintaining that Congress enacted ERISA with the pri-
mary goals of providing uniform legislation and protecting the 
rights of plan participants and their beneficiaries, the majority 
opinion identified specific instances in which Louisiana law 
conflicted with ERISA's purposes.201 The Court reasoned that 
ERISA cases decided prior to the enactment of REA202 allowing 
200. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, PUB.L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984). This 
amendment to ERISA applies to plan years after December 31, 1984. See id. at 1451. 
201. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1762 (1997). Speaking of the specific con-
flicts, the Court stated: 
ERISA's solicitude for the economic security of surviving spouses would 
be undermined by allowing a predeceasing spouse's heirs and legatees 
to have a community property interest in the survivor's annuity. Even 
a plan participant cannot defeat a nonparticipant surviving spouse's 
statutory entitlement to such an annuity. 
Id. 
Id. at 1763. ~ERISA confers pension plan beneficiary status on a nonpar-
ticipant spouse only to the extent that a survivor's annuity is required in 
covered plans. A qualified domestic relations order awards a spouse, de-
pendent, or alternate payee an interest in a participant's benefits." Id. 
Id. at 1764. "The sons are neither participants nor beneficiaries . . . [and their] 
claims are based on Dorothy Boggs' attempted testamentary transfer, not on a designa-
tion by Isaac Boggs or under the terms ofthe retirement plans." Id. 
202. For cases decided before the enactment of REA, see In Re Marriage of Campa, 
89 Cal. App. 3d 113 (1979), cert. denied sub nom. Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. 
Campa, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) (the nonparticipant spouse's rights in and to pension plan 
benefits are not barred by ERISA's spendthrift provision because they are not derived 
from a transfer within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) and the appeal was dis-
missed on jurisdictional grounds for want of a substantial federal question). 
Carpenter's Pension Trust for Southern Cal. v. Kronschnabel, 632 F.2d 745, 748-49 
(9th Cir. 1980). The court stated: 
[A] summary dismissal [by the Supreme Court] for want of a substan-
tial federal question, fully binds the lower courts. The Campa appeal 
definitively presented the question whether ERISA preempts state-
court orders directing a pension plan to pay a community property 
share of a participant's monthly benefits to his or her ex-spouse. The 
Supreme Court has answered that question in the negative. 
Id. 
Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975); 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974); United Ass'n. of Journeyman v. 
Myers, 488 F. Supp. 704, 712-13 (M.D. La. 1980). Louisiana's community property 
laws were not preempted by ERISA's spendthrift provision because community prop-
erty rights are essentially ownership rights and not transfers under state law, thus 
precluding the rmding of an unlawful assignment or alienation in violation of ERISA. 
The court used state law marital property characterization due to ERISA's silence on 
the matter and concluded that, in the absence of Congress' express intent to control, 
30
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol28/iss3/10
1998] BOGGS v. BOGGS 601 
for a spousal community property interest in employment plan 
benefits, were no longer applicable.203 The Court reasoned that 
Congress specifically preempted the future application of those 
holdings204 by amending ERISA's spendthrift provision pursu-
ant to REA.205 
B. ERISA PREEMPrS LOUISIANA COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND 
SUCCESSION LAWS 
The Court characterized ERISA's silence on the testamen-
tary rights of nonparticipant spouses to pension plan benefits 
as support for its conclusion that such rights are nonexistent 
even after the benefits are distributed in accordance with 
ERISA. 206 The majority then denied the sons' claims because 
they were neither participants207 nor beneficiaries.208 Their 
alleged interest was derived from Louisiana community prop-
erty and succession laws that created their mother's right to 
dispose of her interest in the plan benefits.209 In effect, the 
Court held that Dorothy had no testamentary power over her 
state law community interest in the pension plan.210 While 
state community property rights must prevail. United Ass'n. of Journeyman, 488 F. 
Supp. at 712·13 
203. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1764·65 (1997). Congress enacted REA 
with the QDRO exception to provide enhanced protection to nonparticipant spouses 
and children in the event of divorce and, aside from that provision, nonparticipants 
who are not designated beneficiaries cannot achieve beneficiary status by reason of 
marriage or the nature of their dependence. See id. 
204. See supra note 202 for the preempted holdings. 
205. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1764·65 (1997). 
206. See id. at 1763·64 (1997); citing Massachusetts Mut. Life Co. v. Russell, 473 
U.S. 134, 147·48 (1985). 
207. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1764 (1997). 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1994). A "participant" is defmed as "any employee or former 
employee ... who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an 
employee benefit plan .... " [d. 
208. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1764 (1997). 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1994). A "beneficiary" is defmed as one "designated by a par· 
ticipant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to 
a benefit thereunder." [d. 
209. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1765 (1997). 
210. See id. "[I)t would be inimical to ERISA's purposes to allow testamentary reo 
cipients to acquire a competing interest in undistributed pension benefits, which are 
intended to provide a stream of income to participants and their beneficiaries." Id. 
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recognizing the strength of the state interest in the property 
rights of its domicilliaries,2l1 the Court found that the state law 
disposition of Dorothy's community interest directly conflicted 
with ERISA's spendthrift provision?12 As such, the state law 
testamentary disposition constituted a prohibited transfer of 
pension plan benefits.213 
The Court's ruling preempted the sons' claims to each type 
of benefit: the IRA, the Annuity and the ESOP?14 Regarding 
the Annuity, the Court found that ERISA mandates pension 
plans to provide a qualified joint and survivor annuity payable 
to the participant during life and then to the surviving spouse 
of a predeceasing participant.215 Thus, a predeceasing nonpar-
ticipant spouse has no interest or rights in the annuity.216 Be-
Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990). 
ERISA's spendthrift provision "reflects a considered congressional policy choice, a deci-
sion to safeguard a stream of income for pensioners (and their dependents) ... " [d. 
211. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1760 (1997). The Court stated: 
This case lies at the intersection of ERISA pension law and state com-
munity property law. None can dispute the central role community 
property laws play in the nine community property States. It is more 
than a property regime. It is a commitment to the equality of the hus-
band and wife and reflects the real partnership inherent in the marital 
relationship .... Louisiana's community property laws, and the com-
munity property regimes enacted in other States, implement policies 
and values lying within the traditional domain of the States. These 
considerations inform our pre-emption analysis. 
[d. 
Brief for Estate Planning Trust and Probate Law Section of the State 
Bar of California as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5, Boggs v. 
Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-79). "The almost 80 million residents 
in the nine community property jurisdictions have as much as one trillion 
dollars in qualified retirement plans." [d. 
212. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1765 (1997). 
213. See id. 
214. See id. at 1764. 
215. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (1994). "Each pension plan to which this section ap-
plies shall provide that - (1) in the case of a vested participant who retires under the 
plan, the accrued benefit payable to such participant shall be provided in the form of a 
qualified joint and survivor annuity .... " [d. 
29 U.S.C. § 1055(d) (1994). Section 1055(d) states that a qualified joint and survivor 
annuity is an annuity payable from accrued benefits to a plan participant for life then 
to the surviving nonparticipant spouse after death in an amount that is"not less than 
50 percent of (and is not greater than 100 percent 00 the amount of the annuity which 
is payable during the joint lives of the participant and the spouse .... " [d. 
Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1761 (1997). ·Congress' concern for surviving non-
participant spouses is also evident from the expansive coverage of § 1055 ... [because] 
as a general matter [it applies to] ... all pension plans .... " [d. 
216. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1762 (1997). 
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cause Sandra, Isaac's surviving spouse, neither waived her 
rights to the Annuity nor consented to the naming of another 
beneficiary she was entitled to all of the survivor's benefits un-
der ERISA. 217 
The Court then examined the remammg disputed 
benefits.21B The Court held that the interests of pension plan 
participants and beneficiaries are entitled to absolute protec-
tion and payment of benefit distributions must be made only to 
plan participants or beneficiaries.219 Despite the fact that the 
sons' claims were brought against Sandra and not directly 
against the pension plan itself, the Court refused to allow them 
any recovery.220 
Accordingly, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit by finding 
that the sons had no interest in the pension plan benefits be-
cause their mother had no testamentary right over any portion 
of that property.221 The sons' petition for rehearing was 
217. See id. at 1761. Provision of the survivor's annuity may not be waived by the 
participant, absent certain limited circumstances, unless the spouse consents in writ-
ing to the designation of another beneficiary. See id. 
29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2) (1994). In regards to the nonparticipant spouse's consent to 
an alternate beneficiary designation, Section 1055(c)(2) states that such a designation 
"cannot be changed [subsequently) without further spousal consent, witnessed by a 
plan representative or a notary public." [d. 
218. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1762 (1997). The remaining benefits con-
sisted of the IRA, the ESOP shares and a percentage of the monthly annuity payments 
made to Isaac during his retirement. See id. 
219. See id. at 1765. Congress has provided specific and limited exceptions to 
ERISA where it intended to alter the statutory framework. 
Assets of a plan are held for the exclusive purposes of providing bene-
fits to participants and beneficiaries ... Reading ERISA to permit non-
beneficiary interests, even if not enforced against the plan, would result 
in troubling anomalies ... Congress intended to pre-empt [the sons') 
nonbeneficiary, nonparticipant interests ... by the pension plan anti-
alienation provision. The Court further stated that "Dorothy's 1980 
testamentary transfer, which is the source of the [sons') claimed owner-
ship interest is a prohibited 'assignment or alienation'. 
[d. 
26 CFR § 1.401(a) - 13(c)(1)(ii). An assignment and alienation has been defmed as 
"any direct or indirect arrangement whereby a party acquires from a participant or 
beneficiary" an interest enforceable against a plan to "all or any part of a plan benefit 
which is, or may become, payable to the participant or beneficiary." [d. 
220. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1766-1767 (1997). 
221. See id. at 1767. 
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denied.222 The Court then remanded the case to the Fifth Cir-
cuit to vacate the district court's order ruling in favor of the 
sons and enter judgment in accordance with the Supreme 
Court's opinion.223 
VI. CRITIQUE 
The issue in this case was whether state community prop-
erty and succession laws determined testamentary rights in 
community property consisting of qualified pension plan bene-
fits or had Congress intended ERISA to provide the conclusive 
solution in determining ownership of such property.224 When 
considering preemption of laws in an area of traditional state 
legislative concern, such as community property and succession 
laws, Congress and the courts should give deference to the 
strong state interest.225 Within ERISA or its legislative his-
tory, Congress does not provide an express intention to super-
sede state community property and succession laws?26 Where 
222. See Boggs v. Boggs, 118 S. Ct. 9, 10 (1997). 
223. See Boggs v. Boggs, 121 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 1997). 
224. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1758 (1997). 
225. See In Re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890). "The whole subject of the do-
mestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the 
States not to the laws of the United States." [d. . 
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581, 593 (1979). The Court held that the 
nonemployee spouse was not entitled to a community share of railroad retirement 
benefits because the Railroad Retirement Act preempted state community property 
law, but cautioned that family law belongs to the states and courts have limited review 
in determining whether or not to preempt state law. The Hisquierdo Court was hesitant 
to fmd preemption, but found it necessary to prevent infringement of a federal right by 
a state community property law because conflict between the two involved the alloca-
tion of an entitlement to federal benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act. See id. at 
581,590. 
But see, Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 591-96 (1979) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting) (stating the importance of respecting the tradition of state property law be-
cause of the strength of the state interest and asserting the nonemployee spouse's 
present ownership rights). 
226. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994). Section 1001(b) states: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect inter-
state commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit 
plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting 
to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with 
respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, 
and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by provid-
ing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal 
courts. 
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preemption is at issue and Congress has not expressed an in-
tention to preempt state law, the courts must find conflict be-
tween state and federal law before federal law can provide a 
constitutionally conclusive settlement.227 
Although the Boggs Court relied on a standard conflict pre-
emption analysis, the proper focus in determining whether con-
flict exists between federal and state law in the context of 
Boggs is an analysis based on the statutory language and 
meaning of ERISA's preemption and spendthrift provisions.228 
A. THE COURT'S QUESTIONABLE ANALYSIS 
The Boggs majority ignored inquiry into the meaning of 
ERISA's preemption provision and stated that it need only rely 
on basic conflict preemption principles to resolve all issues.229 
The Boggs holding established Sandra's ownership of the pen-
sion plan benefits and preempted the sons' claims largely based 
on what the Court characterized as a conflict between Doro-
Id. 
Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Pre-
emption? A Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
35, 52-53 (Winter, 1996). The article states that, with regard to the legisla-
tive history of ERISA's preemption provision, the House Bill proposed pre-
emption of state laws that relate to reporting, disclosure, fiduciary duties, 
and funding and vesting matters; while the Senate Bill proposed preemp-
tion of state laws that relate to the subject matters regulated by ERISA. 
The preemption provision, as enacted, was the product of the Conference 
Committee's revision roughly a few weeks prior to the January 1, 1975 en-
actment of ERISA. See id. 
227. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states: 
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme. 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
Id. 
228. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1769 (1997). 
229. See id. at 1762. "Conventional conflict pre-emption principles require pre-
emption 'where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impos-
sibility, ... or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" Id., citing Gade v. National Solid 
Wastes Management Ass'n., 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). 
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thy's community property interest in the pension plan benefits 
and ERISA's spendthrift provision.23o The Boggs majority con-
strued Dorothy's ownership and testamentary disposition of 
her community property interest under Louisiana law as a 
prohibited assignment and alienation of Isaac's pension plan 
benefits in conflict with ERISA's spendthrift clause.231 The 
Court reasoned that this assignment and alienation was not 
excepted under the QDRO provision because Congress chose 
not to accommodate testamentary transfers of pension plan 
benefits under this exception.232 Due to ERISA's silence on the 
issue, the Court then extended this reasoning to find that Con-
gress implied that community property claims in the testamen-
tary context were to be preempted because such claims were 
not consistent with ERISA's statutory scheme?33 
B. A COMMUNITY PROPERTY INTEREST Is A PRESENT 
OWNERSHIP INTEREST NOT AN INTEREST DERIVED FROM A 
PROHIBITED AsSIGNMENT OR ALIENATION 
The effect of Louisiana laws governing the ownership and 
testamentary disposition of the pension plan benefits in Boggs 
did not constitute a prohibited "assignment or alienation" un-
der ERISA's spendthrift provision234 and, thus, state law 
should have prevailed. Under Louisiana community property 
law, Dorothy possessed a present ownership interest in the 
pension plan benefits at her death.235 Accordingly, her interest 
was not derived from an assignment or alienation of Isaac's 
pension plan benefits.236 Dorothy's community property inter-
est passed to the sons by operation of state law and was, thus, 
230. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 s. Ct. 1754, 1763-64 (1997). 
231. See id. 
232. See id. at 1764. 
233. See id. at 1763-64. 
234. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(l) (1994). 
235. See T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So.2d 834, 841-44, 846 (La. 1976). 
The nonemployee spouse's community interest in pension plan benefits arises through 
operation of state law and not as a result of an assignment or alienation from the par-
ticipant spouse. See id. 
236. See id. 
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not transferred to them by assignment or alienation?37 The 
Court, however, held to the contrary and the majority's conflict 
analysis in Boggs unconstitutionally divested Dorothy of a tes-
tamentary power over a present ownership interest?38 Fur-
ther, the majority failed to give deference to the fact that the 
sons' inheritance became effective only after the benefits were 
distributed from the pension plan and Isaac's usufruct termi-
nated.239 The Court allowed ERISA to continue its reign over 
distributed property after ERISA's federal purpose had been 
satisfied and assets properly distributed from the plan which it 
controlled.240 
C. PROTECTING THE FEDERAL INTEREST - LIMITED CONFLICT 
AND THE ANNUITY 
The conflict in Boggs, if any, between Louisiana law and 
ERISA existed only in relation to the Annuity benefits?41 The 
Court did not. provide an adequate basis for its fmding of pre-
emption because Sandra's federal rights to the Annuity could 
have been protected while allowing the sons just relief under 
their state law claims.242 Thus, preemption could have been 
limited to the value of the Annuity benefits only?43 Where 
state law offends neither general preemption nor ERISA spe-
cific preemption principles, no conflict with federal law 
exists.244 The Court's contrary holding in Boggs favoring pre-
emption on general principles, despite the absence of state and 
237. See supra notes 42-45 regarding the sons' interest under operation of Louisi-
ana law. 
238. See Brief for State of Louisiana as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
15, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 s. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-79) (citing La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 
2327, 2334 and 2336). 
239. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1771-72 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
240. See id. at 1775-76 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
241. See id. at 1774-76 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
242. See id. at 1776 (Breyer, J., dissenting). "In sum, an annuity goes to Sandra, a 
surviving spouse; but otherwise Dorothy would remain free ... to bequeath, her share 
of the marital estate to her children." [d. 
243. See id. 
244. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979). The Hisquierdo Court 
said that state law 'must do 'major damage' to 'clear and substantial' federal interests 
before the Supremacy Clause will demand that State law be overridden." [d.; citing 
United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966). 
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federal conflict, significantly impacts spousal property rights in 
the nine community property states245 because it prevents state 
community property rights from attaching to property which is 
often the most significant asset of the community?46 
The Court does not give deference to the distinction between 
the concededly impermissible result of awarding the sons a dis-
tribution of a percentage of the monthly Annuity proceeds di-
rectly from the pension plan and the permissible result of pro-
viding them with other, possibly nonpension, Dorothy/lsaac 
community assets of equivalent value.247 Such an equivalent 
value could have been determined pursuant to an accounting of 
their mother's date of death community interest adjusted for 
Isaac's usufruct.248 On the resolution of an accounting pursu-
ant to the sons' state law rights, Sandra could have been 
awarded the Annuitl49 and the sons' claims could have been 
satisfied with an award of other property of equivalent value, if 
necessary and available.250 To the extent that the sons' award 
would invade Sandra's share of the Annuity, and no other 
property was available for its satisfaction, the sons' award re-
lating only to the Annuity benefits would be preempted.251 
Such a holding would have protected the federal interest252 and 
avoided the implied result.253 
D. UNDERSTANDING LOUISIANA LAW AND THE SONS' CLAIMS 
Under Louisiana law, community assets bequeathed by 
Dorothy to Isaac in the form of the usufruct presumably pass 
245. See supra note 134. The nine community property states are Arizona, Califor-
nia, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin. 
246. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1767 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Benefits 
in ERISA qualified pension plans "are often a couple's most important lifetime assets." 
Id. 
247. See id. at 1774-75. 
248. See id. 
249. See id. at 1774-76. 
250. See id. 
251. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1774-76 (1997)(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
252. See id. 
253. See id. "On the assumptions I have made, to fmd a conflict in this case, one 
would have to depart from what Congress actuaily said in ERISA and infer some more 
abstract general purpose ... " Id. 
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naked ownership to the sons on Isaac's death by operation of 
state law.254 Dorothy's bequest to Isaac vested the sons, as 
heirs on her death, with a cause of action for an accounting to 
value her interest on their father's death?55 Based on this ac-
counting, the sons had a right to receive assets of equivalent 
value to their mother's community interest on their father's 
death, subject to his usufruct.256 
Further, Dorothy's will did not operate to transfer pension 
plan benefits prior to their distribution from the pension 
plan.257 Instead, the will operated to control disposition of her 
community interest upon Isaac's death after the benefits were 
distributed from the plan.258 This disposition first took the 
form of Isaac's lifetime usufruct.259 Subsequently, on Issac's 
death, the sons should have been awarded naked ownership of 
the remaining benefits or property of equivalent value attrib-
uted to their mother's community interest as determined by an 
accounting.26o 
The majority in Boggs cites an array of case law supportive 
of preemption, but does not adequately recognize the distin-
254. See supra notes 4245 regarding Louisiana usufruct, naked ownership and 
succession principles. 
255. See id. 
256. See id. 
257. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1772 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
258. See id. 
See Brieffor Respondents at 18, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-79). 
Sandra's preemption claim is in conflict with Congress' intent and past holdings of the 
Court because it ignores the distinction between the effect of state law on benefits [after 
distributionl, as opposed to benefit plans. (Emphasis added.) In effect, the former 
being merely a property interest after distribution in accordance with the ERISA quali-
fied provisions of the latter. See id. 
But see, Brief for Petitioner at 15, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-79). 
The pre-distribution/post-distribution issue represents "a distinction without a differ-
ence~ because the Fifth Circuit majority recognized the very existence of the plan when 
it found that Dorothy had a community interest in the benefits on her date of death 
prior to their distribution upon Isaac's retirement in 1985. The brief calls for preemp-
tion based on the argument that the Fifth Circuit majority's recognition is proof that 
Louisiana's laws 'relate to' the plan under ERISA's preemption clause because the 
"[slons' claims are premised on the very existence of the vel non of the Bell Plan.~ [d. 
259. See supra note 42 regarding usufruct. 
260. See supra notes 4245 regarding Louisiana usufruct, naked ownership and 
succession principles. 
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guished characteristics of the sons' claims.261 With the excep-
tion of Ablamis,262 the cases cited in the Court's preemption 
analysis should not have been applied to resolve the dispute in 
Boggs because the cited cases concern federally funded benefit 
plans or programs and conflicting state law.263 The Boggs plan, 
however, was privately funded with community funds.264 Con-
gress enacted ERISA to regulate only private employee benefit 
plans and to protect participants and beneficiaries by providing 
a framework for plan integrity and security in the payment of 
benefits.265 
Under Louisiana community property law, funds contrib-
uted, as deferred compensation, into private benefits plans are 
fruits of the labor of the community.266 On its face, the contri-
bution of community income to fund ERISA regulated benefit 
plans merely represents an investment strategy.267 Such a 
strategic investment choice, however, should not alter the pre-
dictable status of property ownership under state law by sub-
jecting the property to federal control which compels a result 
261. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (1997). "ERISA pre-empts a testa-
mentary transfer by a nonparticipant spouse of her community property interest in 
undistributed pension plan benefits." [d. 
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979). Railroad Retirement Act benefits 
cannot be divided on divorce under state community property law. See id. 
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981). The Supremacy Clause warrants pre-
emption of any division of federal military pay in state divorce proceedings. See id. 
Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981). The Supremacy Clause prohibits state in-
tervention into a service member's right to designate the beneficiary of federally 
funded insurance and the surviving spouse of a service member cannot enforce an 
interest in federally funded insurance proceeds based on state community property 
laws. See id. 
Free v. Bland 369 U.S. 663 (1962). Treasury regulations providing for the survivor's 
ownership in accordance with the manner in which title to U.S. savings bonds was held 
to preempt conflicting state law; despite the fact that the bonds were purchased with 
community funds. See id. 
262. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991). 
263. See supra note 261 regarding the Hisquierdo, McCarty, Ridgway cases. 
264. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1767 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
265. See supra note 102 regarding ERISA's intended purposes. 
266. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2338 (West 1996). Article 2338 states that community 
property includes "property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through 
the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse." [d. 
267. See supra note 35 regarding tax incentives in connection with participation in 
qualified benefit plans. 
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inconsistent with one's testamentary scheme.268 The Court's 
construction ignores the core basis of the community property 
system and creates uncertain and undesirable effects for the 
multitudes whose property rights it has altered?69 
The majority cited the equitable nature of the REA amend-
ments to ERISA as evidence of Congress' intent to provide a 
stream of income for surviving spouses.270 A state law regu-
lating the plan to effect payment of benefits directly to a third 
party clearly frustrates the federal purpose because such a 
transfer, if not a QDRO, would be a prohibited assignment or 
alienation under federal law.271 Preemption would be neces-
sary to protect the integrity of the federal legislation in this 
context.272 If this were the actual issue before the Court, the 
majority would be correct in ruling for Sandra based on 
ERISA's spendthrift clause.273 
The sons, however, merely sought an accounting to value 
their mother's community interest in the pension plan benefits 
after the benefits were distributed from the pension plan.274 
This distribution was in compliance with ERISA and the sons 
did not request relief from the Court in the form of a direct 
payment of a percentage of the monthly Annuity payments 
from the plan.275 ERISA should no longer apply to control 
268. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1772, 1775 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
269. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1760 (1997). "The nine community prop-
erty states have some 80 million residents, with perhaps $1 trillion in retirement 
plans." [d. 
270. See id. at 1761. 
271. See 26 CFR § 1.401(a) - 13(c)(I)(ii). An assignment and alienation has been de-
fined as "any direct or indirect arrangement whereby a party acquires from a partici-
pant or beneficiary" an interest enforceable against a plan to "all or any part of a plan 
benefit which is, or may become, payable to the participant or beneficiary." [d. 
See Brieffor Respondents at 33-39, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-
79). However, the above defmition [pursuant to 26 CFR § 1.401(a) - 13(c)(l)(ii») speaks 
in terms of enforcement against a plan and applies to benefits which are "payable. D 
(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, this defmition should not control in Boggs because 
enforcement against the plan was not sought and the benefits had already been dis-
tributed in compliance with ERISA. See id. 
272. See Brief for Respondents at 33-39, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 
96-79). 
273. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1770, 1774 (1997) (Breyer, dissenting). 
274. See id. at 1774. 
275. See id. 
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property once it is distributed in accordance with the plan.276 
The majority, however, did not give deference to the fact that 
the benefits had already been duly disbursed by the pension 
plan.277 
E. THE FACTS OF BOGGS ARE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM ABLAMIS 
The significant distinction between the facts of Ablamis and 
Boggs is that in Boggs the plan benefits were already distrib-
uted when the state laws at issue came into operation?78 In 
Ablamis, however, the benefits had yet to be distributed from 
the ERISA governed benefit plan.279 The Ablamis court held 
that ERISA preempted California community property laws 
which otherwise gave the predeceasing nonemployee spouse a 
testamentary interest in a surviving employee spouse's vested, 
but undistributed, pension benefits.280 Despite this distinction, 
the United States Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit in 
Boggs and remanded the case.281 
The Ablamis reasoning relies on the Ninth Circuit's reading 
of a statute and legislative record that are silent on the treat-
ment of probate orders under the QDRO exception?82 The si-
lence in this regard could imply that probate orders are outside 
the scope of the QDRO exception and, therefore, are not ex-
cepted.283 Conversely, this legislative silence could imply that 
probate orders are outside the scope of ERISA and, therefore, 
are not in conflict.284 The Ablamis majority, by implication, 
extends ERISA's reach in a manner that is inconsistent with 
Congress' legislative intentions by enlarging the meaning of 
276. See id. at 1775. 
277. See id. at 1761. 
278. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1761 (1997). 
279. See id. at 1759. 
280. See id. 
281. See id. at 1767. 
282. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F. 2d 1450, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1991) (Fletcher, J., 
dissenting). State marital property laws do not conflict with ERISA and the statute as 
written by Congress "cannot be read as creating the testamentary disenfranchisement 
of a predeceasing spouse." [d. at 1467, n.2. 
283. See id. at 1462-63. 
284. See id. 
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REA's QDRO exception to exclude application to community 
property rights in a testamentary context.285 
The preemption that divested the nonparticipant spouse of 
testamentary rights over the community share of pension plan 
benefits in Ablamis was grounded in that court's circular rea-
soning. The majority assumed that because a probate order did 
not fit within the statute's definition of a "qualified domestic 
relations order" it could not come within the exception provided 
under REA. 286 REA, however, does not expressly recognize 
probate orders within the QDRO exception and, thus, should 
not be read to implicitly allow for the preemption of probate 
orders.287 REA's silence with respect to testamentary rights 
places state law governing such rights out of its preemptive 
reach.288 If Congress had intended preemption in such a set-
ting, then it would have expressly provided for such treatment 
under REA. 289 
The REA amendment provides an exception to ERISA's 
spendthrift provision and recognizes state community property 
law only in the divorce context and only to the extent that a 
division of marital assets is based on community property prin-
ciples as reflected in the QDRO.290 Therefore, pre-REA case 
law should generally provide the proper basis for determining 
the community property rights of nonparticipant spouses in a 
testamentary setting.291 
285. See id. at 1460. 
286. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) (1994). A QDRO is dermed as "a domestic 
relations order - which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee's right 
to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits 
payable with respect to a participant under a plan ... " Id. 
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (1994). A QDRO is exempt from ERISA's spendthrift pro-
vision. See id. 
287. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) (1994). 
288. See 130 CONGo REC. H 875 (1984). Rep. Erlenborn's statement that REA was 
not intended to "derme or restrict the marital property interest in retirement benefits 
as determined under state law." Id. 
289. See supra notes 148-59. 
290. See id. 
291. For cases decided before the enactment of REA, see In Re Marriage of Campa, 
89 Cal. App. 3d 113 (1979), cert. denied sub nom., Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. 
Campa, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) (the nonparticipant spouse's rights in and to pension plan 
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F. ALTERING THE SPHERE OF TRADITIONAL STATE LEGISLATIVE 
CONCERN 
The state laws at issue here are family, property and pro-
bate.292 These areas traditionally occupy the sphere of state 
legislative concern293 and may be superseded only if Congress 
has clearly expressed an intention to legislate within those ar-
eas.294 Congress enacted ERISA to regulate private pension 
plans and not to alter an individual's state granted property 
rights. 295 In Boggs, Louisiana laws allowing for the sons' in-
heritance should not be preempted under proper analysis fo-
cused on the language and intended purpose of ERISA's pre-
emption provision because the state laws do not "relate to" a 
regulated plan.296 A state law "relate[sl to" an ERISA regu-
lated plan within the meaning of the federal preemption provi-
sion where it expressly refers to or has a connection with such 
a plan.297 The Louisiana laws at issue in Boggs were not 
benefits are not barred by ERISA's spendthrift provision because they do not constitute 
a transfer within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) and the appeal was dismissed on 
jurisdictional grounds for want of a substantial federal question). 
See United Ass'n. of Journeyman v. Myers, 488 F. Supp. 704 (M.D. La. 1980). Lou-
isiana's community property laws were not preempted by ERISA's spendthrift provi-
sion because community property rights are essentially ownership rights and not 
transfers under state law, thus precluding the fmding of an unlawful assignment or 
alienation in violation of ERISA. The court used state law marital property characteri-
zation due to ERISA's silence on the matter and concluded that, in the absence of Con-
gress' express intent to control, state community property rights must prevail. See id. 
292. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1770 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). "I 
cannot say that the state law at issue here concerns a subject that Congress wished to 
place outside the State's legal reach ... the state law in question involves family, prop-
erty, and probate - all areas of traditional, and important, state concern." [d. 
293. See id. 
294. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977). Congress' intent 
to legislate within a particular sphere reflects intent to preempt all state laws in that 
field regardless of whether or not the effective enactments expressly prohibit all state 
legislation within that area oflegislative concern. See id. 
295. See supra note 102 regarding ERISA's intended purposes. 
296. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1,7, 15 (1987). In refusing to 
preempt state law and distinguishing between state laws that regulate employee bene-
fit plans and those that provide for a system of benefit distribution after the funds are 
paid out, the Court stated that the state law" ... fails to implicate the regulatory con-
cerns of ERISA itself ... because "ERISA's pre-emption provision does not refer to state 
laws relating to 'employee benefits' but to state laws relating to 'employee benefit plans . 
. .... (Emphasis added.) [d. 
297. See California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 
117 S. Ct. 832, 837 (1997). 
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within the scope of ERISA's preemption prOVISIOn because 
those laws do not refer to ERISA regulated employee benefit 
plans.298 These state laws instead refer to property rights.299 
Further, the Louisiana laws preempted in Boggs did not have a 
prohibited connection with an ERISAplan.30o These state laws 
instead have a connection with distributed benefits.30l Addi-
tionally, state community property and succession laws are not 
legislative fields which Congress has historically sought to oc-
cupy.302 Thus, it follows that state law operations within those 
298. See id. 
N.Y. Conference of Blue Cross v. Travelers Ins., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1677-78 (1995) 
(Souter, J., analyzing ERISA's preemption clause, and in particular, the meaning of the 
'relate to' phrase within ERISA's preemption provision). "We simply must go beyond 
the unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of deflning its key term, and look in-
stead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that 
Congress understood would survive." [d. 
Justice Souter concluded that Congress intended to avoid a multitude of indirectly 
conflicting state regulation and provide national uniformity with respect to the ad-
ministration of employee beneflt plans. (Emphasis added.) See id. at 1680, 1683. 
299. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2325 (West 1996). Article 2325 states that a mat-
rimonial regime creates a system of property ownership and management between 
married persons and toward third persons. See id. 
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2338 (West 1996). Article 2338 states that community prop-
erty includes "property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through the 
effort, skill, or industry of either spouse ... " [d. 
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2336 (West 1996). Article 2336 states "each spouse owns a 
present undivided one-half interest in the community property." [d. 
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 535 (West 1996). Article 535 states that: "Usufruct is a real 
right of limited duration on the property of another. The features of the right vary 
with the nature of the things subject to it as consumables or nonconsumables." [d. 
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 538 (West 1996). Article 538 states that, at the termination 
of the usufruct, the usufructuary [holder of the usufructl of a consumable is "bound to 
pay the naked owner either the value that the things had at the commencement of the 
usufruct or deliver to him things of the same quantity or quality." [d. 
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 478 (West 1996). Article 478 states: "The ownership of a 
thing burdened with a usufruct is designated as naked ownership." [d. 
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 477 (West 1996). Article 477 states: "Ownership is the right 
that confers on a person direct, immediate, and exclusive authority over a thing. The 
owner of a thing may use, enjoy, and dispose of it within the limits and under condi-
tions established by law." [d. 
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 940 (West 1996). Article 940 states: "A succession is ac-
quired by the legal heir, who is called by law to the inheritance, immediately after the 
death of the deceased person to whom he succeeds." [d. 
300. See California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 
117 S. Ct. 832, 838 (1997). 
301. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1770 (1997). 
302. See id. at 1761. The Court stated "[nlor need we consider the applicability of 
fleld pre-emption ... " [d. 
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fields should not be subject to preemption on the alternative 
theory offield preemption or otherwise.303 
The Louisiana laws at issue provide for the testamentary 
distribution of community property derived from whatever 
source within the constitutional parameters of the state's police 
power.304 As a general matter, once property is distributed to 
the domicilliary of a state from a federally regulated pension 
plan state law becomes operative and may affect the subse-
quent disposition of the distributed property.305 For example, 
state income tax is owed on distributed benefits and state law 
may proscribe certain uses of the distributed benefits as 
fraudulent.306 
In sum, ERISA should not control an estate distribution 
through preemption of state community property and succes-
303. See Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978). A state law will be 
preempted if it is within a legislative field which Congress has sought to occupy. See 
id. 
304. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. "The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people." Id. 
See T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So.2d 834, 841-44, 846 (La. 1976). Pen-
sion plan benefits are community property. See id. 
305. See Brief for State of Louisiana as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
6-7, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754' (1997) (No. 96-79). Stating, with regard to pre-
emption by ERISA that: 
A workable bright-line rule is this: state law has no application until 
pension funds are distributed out of the pension plan since the purpose 
of ERISA is to assure that plans are well administered by fiduciaries 
who are freed from interference from state orders and state law claims. 
Once funds are distributed, state law fully attaches. State income tax 
is owed. State law defining what is a fraudulent use of the funds ap-
plies. All aspects of state property law apply. The same bright-line test 
applies to the anti-alienation section of ERISA. Plan administrators 
are to ignore instructions ... to pay benefits to some third party (such 
as a creditor). However, once funds are distributed, they may be used 
[in a manner that could be termed an alienation under federal regula-
tion]. Under'this sensible bright-line rule, the timing of an alienation 
document is irrelevant under ERISA so long as it has no impact on pen-
sion plan administrators and no effect in rem on pension funds until 
they fall under the control of state property law after distribution. 
Id. 
N.Y. Conference of Blue Cross v. Travelers Ins., 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995) 
(state surcharges imposed on employee health care plans do not 'relate to' 
employee benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA's preemption clause). 
306. See Brief for State of Louisiana as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
6-7, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-79). 
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sion laws once its federal purposes are met by direct payment 
of the plan benefits to the participant or the designated benefi-
ciary.307 Congress has expressed no intention that ERISA su-
persede state family, property and probate laws on such 
facts.3OB The Court's holding despite these legislative deficien-
cies usurps the state laws at issue in Boggs and unconstitu-
tionally preempts the ownership rights of Dorothy and the 
sons.309 
VII. PRACTICAL ESTATE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 
The Boggs decision raises some significant questions for pro-
fessionals planning estates that include community property 
and community property rights.310 Unfortunately, the holding 
does not provide definitive answers to some of the significant 
questions' it raises.3ll These questions primarily involve the 
use of the unified credie12 and the marital deduction313 for es-
tate tax purposes.314 Although a thorough discussion of the 
federal estate tax ramifications is beyond the scope of this 
Note, consideration is given to the basic estate planning and 
tax issues arising from the pervasive impact of Boggs. Ac-
cordingly, this section will focus on the basic estate planning 
and federal estate tax inquiries and the apparent answers 
flowing from the Boggs decision.315 
307. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 s. Ct. 1754, 1775-76 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
308. See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text regarding Congress' intent that 
ERISA supersede" state law. 
309. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1776 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
310. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs u. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No. 
5 TAX NOTES 679, 683 (1997). 
311. See id. at 683-85. 
312. See I.R.C. § 2010 (1997). This Code section provides for the unified credit 
amount against estate tax. The applicable credit amount is the amount of the tentative 
tax determined under the rate schedule set forth in I.R.C. 2001(c) (1997). See id. 
I.R.C. § 2505 (1997). This Code section provides for the unified credit to be applied 
against estate tax. See id. 
313. See I.R.C. § 2056 (1997). This Code section provides for the marital deduction, 
which permits a husband and wife to transfer unlimited amounts to each other without 
federal estate or gift tax consequences on the death of the first spouse. See id. 
314. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs u. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No. 
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997). 
315. See infra notes 316-70 and accompanying text. 
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A. THE UNIFIED CREDIT AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY ESTATE 
PLANNING 
Though a degree of uncertainty exists,316 the holding in 
Boggs 317 appears to adversely limit the use of the unified credit 
in community property states.318 Available to each taxpayer 
only once, the unified credit is a credit against gift and estate 
tax levied on inter vivos gifts and death transfers.319 This 
credit can be aggregated on a rolling basis until the total limit 
is reached.320 The unified credit against gift and estate tax is 
currently $202,050 for decedents dying in 1998, which is the 
equivalent of tax imposed on taxable gift transfers totaling 
$625,000.321 Thus, as a practical matter, this credit allows for 
an individual tax shelter of $625,000 worth of taxable giftS?22 
Proper planning utilizing a combination of techniques allows a 
married couple to transfer a total of $1,250,000 worth of gifts 
tax free.323 The most basic combination of spousal estate plan-
ning techniques commonly used in community property states 
are the bypass trust and inter vivos giftS.324 
316. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs u. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No. 
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997). 
317. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997). 
318. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs v. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No. 
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997). 
319. See REGIS W. CAMPFIELD, MARTIN B. DICKINSON, JR. AND WILLIAM J. TuRNIER, 
TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 35 (19th ed., CCH Inc. 1994). 
320. See id. at 127. 
I.R.C. § 2010 (1997). This Code section provides for the unified credit amount 
against estate tax. The applicable credit amount is the amount of the tentative tax 
determined under the rate schedule set forth in I.R.C. 2001(c) (1997). See id. 
I.R.C. § 2505 (1997). This Code section provides for the unified credit to be applied 
against estate tax. See id. 
321. See I.R.C. 2010 (1997) and I.R.C. 2505 (1997). 
322. See REGIS W. CAMPFIELD, MARTIN B. DICKINSON, JR. AND WILLIAM J. TURNIER, 
TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 127-29 (19th ed., CCH Inc. 1994). The 
author of this Note has adjusted the amount of the tax shelter referenced in the text 
above to conform with the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, which amended I.R.C. 2010 and 
I.R.C. 2505. 
323. See id. 
324. See id. 
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The bypass trust is primarily designed to take full advan-
tage of each spouse's unified credit against estate tax.325 The 
decedent's personal representative must take care not to make 
a QTIP election under I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) with respect to the 
property left to fund the bypass trust so that the predeceasing 
spouse's unified credit can be used to offset any tax imposed on 
the property left to this trust.326 If, however, there is no prop-
erty to fund the bypass trust, the estate plan will fail and all 
marital property will be taxed on the survivor's death without 
the offset of the predeceasing spouse's unified credit.327 Fur-
ther, the estate tax liability is increased because the marital 
property could not be split to take advantage of the progressive 
tax rate scheme.328 
The Boggs 329 holding may prevent the effective implemen-
tation of the bypass trust in community property states by ex-
cluding the value of any pension plan assets from the estate of 
a predeceasing nonparticipant spouse.330 Because such funds 
often constitute the largest asset of a married couple, the ex-
clusion of the value of these funds from the estate of the prede-
ceasing nonparticipant spouse may prevent the bypass trust 
from being funded.331 The failure of the bypass trust estate 
plan results in an increased taxable estate on the death of the 
survivor because the predeceasing spouse lacked sufficient as-
sets to use the unified credit and the progressive tax rates to 
full advantage.332 
325. See id. This vehicle is commonly known as the bypass trust because, in the 
case of a married couple with assets sufficient to cause estate tax concerns, it ulti-
mately offers a credit shelter for the surviving spouse beneficiary. See id. 
326. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs v. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No. 
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997). 
327. See id. 
328. See id. 
329. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997). 
330. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs v. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No. 
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997). 
331. See id. 
332. See KATHRYN A. BALLSUN AND ANNE K HILKER, ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE 
VOL. 1110-13 (Continuing Education ofthe Bar-California 1997). 
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B. THE MARITAL DEDUCTION AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
ESTATE PLANNING 
Despite the apparent exclusion in Boggs of a community 
interest in ERISA plan benefits from the predeceasing nonpar-
ticipant spouse's taxable gross estate, inclusion of such an in-
terest would allow it to pass tax free to the surviving partici-
pant spouse under the unlimited marital deduction.333 This 
deduction may also be utilized in the case of a predeceasing 
participant spouse with respect to the transfer of the benefits 
to the nonparticipant spouse.334 If however, on the death of the 
first spouse, this is the only credit or deduction taken, the sur-
viving spouse's estate would be taxed without the benefit of the 
marital deduction and with only the survivor's unified credit 
available.335 
C. AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE EFFECT OF THE BYPASS TRUST: 
The bypass trust is designed to provide income to the bene-
ficiary spouse for life with the corpus in trust for the children 
or third parties so that at the death of the surviving spouse, the 
assets of the bypass trust are not includable in the surviving 
spouse's gross estate.336 This technique is an effective planning 
tool utilized to avoid or mitigate the tax liability of married 
couples with assets sufficient to raise estate tax concerns on 
the death of the surviving spouse.337 In the full credit situa-
tion, the use of a bypass trust excludes the taxation of $625,000 
(the tax shelter amount under the unified credit) of assets on 
the death of the first spouse after December 31, 199r38 by al-
333. See I.R.C. § 2056 (1997). This Code section provides for the marital deduction, 
which permits a husband and wife to transfer unlimited amounts to each other without 
federal estate or gift tax consequences on the death of the first spouse. See id. 
334. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs v. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No. 
5 TAX NOTES 679, 684-685 (1997). 
335. See REGIS W. CAMPFIELD, MARTIN B. DICKINSON, JR. AND WILLIAM J. TURNIER, 
TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 127-29 (19th ed., CCH Inc. 1994). 
336. See KATHRYN A. BALLSUN AND ANNE K HILKER, ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE 
VOL. 1110-13 (Continuing Education of the Bar-California 1997). 
337. See id. at 110. 
338. See I.R.C. § 2010 (1997). This Code section provides for the unified credit 
amount against estate tax. The applicable credit amount is the amount of the tentative 
tax determined under the rate schedule set forth in I.R.C. 2001(c) (1997). See id. 
50
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol28/iss3/10
1998] BOGGS V. BOGGS 621 
lowing that predeceased spouse's unified credit to offset the tax 
imposed on the property transferred to the trust.339 Assuming 
that the trust is administered properly and generates sufficient 
income without significant gain in value, the surviving spouse 
can use the income but transfer the trust principal, as well as 
his or her own estate, tax free at death.340 By naming the sur-
viving spouse as the beneficiary of the bypass trust, a termina-
ble interest is created.341 Thus, the assets of the trust are not 
includable in the estate of the surviving spouse because the 
surviving spouse's interest is essentially a life estate termina-
ble on death.342 Accordingly, the unified credit of the prede-
ceasing spouse is fully utilized and tax on the transfer of the 
excess to the surviving spouse is avoided under the marital de-
duction and the marital assets will consequently bypass the 
survivor's estate.343 In a situation where one spouse's property 
interests are substantially larger than the other spouse's, an 
inter vivos gift can be used to equalize the estates and maxi-
mize use of the credit.344 
The following simplified, but illustrative, scenarios assume 
a textbook example marital gross estate of $1,250,000 to dem-
onstrate the effect of the bypass trust.345 The first scenario as-
sumes that no bypass trust was in place and that the married 
couple decided, on the death of the first spouse, to only take 
See I.R.C. § 2505 (1997). This Code section provides for the unified credit to be ap-
plied against estate tax. See id. 
See I.R.C. § 2001(c) provides the rate schedule to be used in detennining the tenta-
tive tax on the applicable exclusion amount. See id. 
339. See KATHRYN A. BALLSUN AND ANNE K HILKER, ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE 
VOL. 1110-13 (Continuing Education of the Bar-California 1997). 
340. See id. 
341. See REGIS W. CAMPFIELD, MARTIN B. DICKINSON, JR. AND WILLIAM J. TURNIER, 
TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 660-62 (19th ed., CCH Inc. 1994). 
342. See id. 
343. See id. 
344. See REGIS W. CAMPFIELD, MARTIN B. DICKINSON, JR. AND WILLIAM J. TURNIER, 
TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 127-29 (19th ed., CCH Inc. 1994). 
345. See id. The simplified scenario discussed in the text above assumes that no 
QTIP election with respect to trust property is made by the predeceasing spouse's per-
sonal representative under I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7). It also assumes no significant apprecia-
tion of the assets of the surviving spouse's personal representative held outside of the 
trust. The author of this Note has adjusted all values referenced in the text above to 
confonn to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended by the Tax Payer Relief Act of 
1997. 
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advantage of the marital deduction.346 Accordingly, because of 
the marital deduction, the entire community property estate of 
$1,250,000 is transferred outright to the survivor free of tax.347 
The estate of the survivor, however, will be subject to federal 
estate tax upon his or her death because the survivor will be 
able to take advantage of only his or her unified credit.348 
Thus, assuming no significant appreciation or depreciation, the 
survivor's taxable estate for federal estate tax purposes is 
$1,250,000.349 The unified credit will preclude tax on $625,000 
and the remaining $625,000 will be subject to federal estate 
tax.350 
In the second scenario, assume that a bypass trust is funded 
on the death of the first spouse.351 This technique will direct 
$625,000 to be transferred to a bypass trust for the surviving 
spouse's benefit during his or her life, with the remainder in-
terest in the trust for the benefit of the spouses' children or 
third parties.352 . Thus, on the death of the first spouse, no fed-
eral estate tax is due on the $625,000 tax shelter amount be-
cause of the use of the unified credit and the amount trans-
ferred in excess of the $625,000 in trust qualifies for the mari-
tal deduction.353 The amount in excess of $625,000 passes out-
right to the surviving spouse and, assuming no significant ap-
preciation of the assets transferred, will not be taxed on the 
survivor's death due to the availability of the unified credit.354 
If the assets appreciate, only the amount in excess of $625,000 
is subject to federal estate tax because of the availability of the 
unified credit.355 This results in no taxable estate on the death 
of the survivor because his or her taxable estate does not in-
346. See KATHRYN A. BALLSUN AND ANNE K HILKER, ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE 
VOL. 1110-13 (Continuing Education of the Bar-California 1997). 
347. See id. 
348. See id. 
349. See id. 
350. See id. 
351. See KATHRYN A. BALLSUN AND ANNE K HILKER, ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE 
VOL. 1 110-13 (Continuing Education of the Bar-California 1997). 
352. See id. 
353. See id. 
354. See id. 
355. See id. 
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elude the assets of the bypass trust as this interest is only a life 
interest terminable at death.356 Thus, the use of the bypass 
trust eliminates estate tax on both spouse's estates.357 
Boggs358 may thwart the effectiveness of this plan within 
community property states because it prohibits a predeceasing 
nonparticipant spouse from having a testamentary power over 
a community property interest in qualified pension plan bene-
fits. 359 Thus, the Boggs holding prevents a credit from being 
taken on assets in or distributed from employee benefit 
plans.36o Because these benefits are usually the largest asset of 
the community, the effectiveness of the bypass technique is 
jeopardized for many married couples unless there are other 
significant community assets.361 If no other significant com-
munity assets exist, the trust cannot be funded and all of the 
marital assets may be taxed on the death of the surviving 
spouse.362 
D. THE IRA AND THE UNIFIED CREDIT 
Boggs may also prevent IRA funds from being similarly 
used in connection with estate planning goals designed to take 
maximum advantage of the unified credit.363 This appears true 
to the extent that the source of the assets used to fund the IRA 
can be traced to ERISA benefits.364 The Boggs decision over-
rules at least one California Supreme Court holding by not rec-
ognizing IRA funds as community property.365 This treatment 
by the Boggs Court further limits the options available to make 
356. See KATHRYN A. BALLSUN AND ANNE K HILKER, ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE 
VOL. 1110-13 (Continuing Education of the Bar-California 1997). 
357. See id. 
358. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997). 
359. See id. at 1762-64. 
360. See id. 
361. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs v. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No. 
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997). 
362. See id. 
363. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs v. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No. 
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997). 
364. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1764 (1997). 
365. See Estate of MacDonald, 794 P.2d 911 (Cal. 1990). The assets in an IRA 
were held to be community property. See id. 
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effective use of taxpayer credits by removing another signifi-
cant asset from the available pool of community resources.366 
E. THE RETURN OF THE TERMINABLE INTEREST RULE 
The Boggs decision also appears to trigger the return of the 
terminable interest rule367 because it does not allow for a pre-
deceasing nonparticipant spouse's testamentary power over a 
community interest in undistributed benefits in the surviving 
participant spouse's ERISA benefit plan.368 Thus, a community 
interest under state law is not to be included in the predeceas-
ing nonparticipant spouse's gross estate for federal tax pur-
poses and the value otherwise attributed to this interest is not 
subject to estate tax.369 The surviving participant spouse, how-
ever, will likely face increased estate tax liability as a result of 
this transfer, unless estate planning techniques control this 
property's taxable exposure.370 
VII. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS 
The impact of Boggs significantly affects the community 
property system by creating uncertainty among estate plan-
ning attorneys and participants and beneficiaries who may now 
need to amend or abandon their estate plans.371 It alters the 
predictable state community property and succession rights in 
a manner that was not foreseen and on which participants and 
beneficiaries in community property states have not been con-
366. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs u. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No. 
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997). 
367. See id. at 684. Most believe that California repealed the terminable interest 
rule in 1986 pursuant to the repeal of I.R.C. § 2039(c) in that same year. The change 
required the predeceasing nonparticipant spouse's community interest in the survivor's 
benefits to be included in the predeceasing spouse's gross estate for federal estate tax 
purposes in situations where the nonparticipant predeceased the participant. The 
terminable interest rule now seems applicable only in cases involving a predeceased 
nonparticipant spouse. See id. 
368. See id. 
369. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs u. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No. 
5 TAX NOTES 679, 684 (1997). 
370. See id. 
371. See id. 
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clusively heard through their elected representatives.372 The 
Boggs holding creates uncertainty for attorneys in community 
property states to properly advise clients on estate planning 
strategy because it is an overly broad judicial solution on a 
unique set of facts.373 The issues presented in Boggs, however, 
are worthy of and require a detailed legislative resolution.374 A 
legislative resolution enacted to provide clarity, predictability 
and guidance as to ERISA's relation to the community property 
and testamentary rights of participants, spouse's and benefici-
aries is needed.375 Such a solution requires Congress to recog-
nize the impact of the Boggs decision and, if desired, preempt 
its effects after due consideration based on detailed fmdings 
throughout the process.376 
One proposed solution would be to clarify ERISA's preemp-
tion provision so that it expressly excepts state community 
property and succession laws that do not directly regulate 
ERISA governed pension plans. This would allow for the state 
law testamentary disposition of benefits after distribution from 
the employee benefit plan. Another proposal is to further 
amend ERISA's spendthrift provision to either include probate 
orders under the QDRO exception or provide for some similar 
mechanism by which probate orders can qualify for an excep-
tion. Any amendment of ERISA's spendthrift clause should 
also expressly recognize that a community property interest 
constitutes a present ownership interest with inherent testa-
mentary rights and not an interest derived from a prohibited 
assignment or alienation. Further, any such future legislation 
should give specific deference to estate planning and tax rami-
fica tions. 377 
372. See supra notes 310-70 and accompanying text. 
373. See supra notes 310-70 and accompanying text. 
374. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs u. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No.5 
TAX NOTES 679, 685-86 (1997). 
375. See id. 
376. See id. 
377. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs u. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No.5 
TAX NOTES 679, 686 (1997). 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
Numerous cases have been filed in relation to issues of 
ERISA preemption 'of various state laws.378 The Boggs case 
and its extended, contested history prove that Congress needs 
to clearly delineate the extent of ERISA preemption within the 
testamentary context.379 ERISA's broadly stated preemption 
provision and vague spendthrift provision are inadequate due 
to complexities unforeseen at the time the provisions were 
drafted.380 If the legislation is to withstand the test of constitu-
tional validity, Congress must consider matters of which the 
legislative record is void.381 Such consideration may have pre-
vented the federal intrusion upon the state granted rights in 
Boggs or, in the alternative, provided for a clear solution to 
avoid unnecessary litigation.382 
The Boggs Court stated that ERISA was not amenable to 
the "sweeping extratextual extension,,s83 necessary to fmd im-
plied support for the sons' claims, but failed to act on its own 
advice regarding implied reasoning and held in favor of Sandra 
by broad implication to the contrary.384 In essence, the Court 
decided what Congress would do if it were to legislate on this 
specific issue and ignored the fact that Congress has taken no 
action to definitively address the specific issue of ERISA pre-
emption of a predeceasing nonparticipant spouse's community 
property rights.385 Such a solution rarely forms the basis for 
sound future legal application because it often creates no logi-
378. See Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemp-
tion? A Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARY. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 59 n.l06 
(Winter, 1996). Over 3,000 cases have been filed in the courts in relation to issues of 
ERISA preemption of state laws. 
California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 117 S. Ct. 
832 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). "Since ERISA was enacted in 1974, this Court has 
accepted certiorari in, and decided, no less than 14 cases to resolve conflicts ... re-
garding ERISA pre-emption of various sorts of state law." Id. 
379. See Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1996), affg, 849 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. La. 
1994), reu'd, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997). 
380. See supra notes 103-33, 148-59 and accompanying text. 
381. See supra notes 103-33, 148-59 and accompanying text. 
382. See supra notes 224-309 and accompanying text. 
383. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1765 (1997). 
384. See id. at 1776 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
385. See id. 
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cal and conclusive rule designed for uniform application.386 
The majority's holding is one way to theoretically provide uni-
form regulation, but legislative solutions can better provide for 
proper and consistent future treatment where such sensitive 
and traditional state interests as community property and suc-
cession rights are involved.387 
In particular, a legislative solution will allow the signifi-
cantly numerous population of plan participants and benefici-
aries domiciled in community property states to have their con-
cerns conclusively determined through the legislative process. 
Accordingly, the consensus of those whose property rights in 
pension benefits are adversely affected by the Boggs holding 
may provide for the desired level of protection of, what is to 
many, the most valuable economic asset of life's labor. 
Tony Vecino* 
386. See id. 
387. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs u. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No. 
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685-86 (1997). 
* Golden Gate University, Class of 1999. I wish to express my gratitude to all 
those who contributed their editorial support to the publication of this Note. 
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